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Abstract 
 
 
This study examines the price reaction to the announcements of joint venture and strategic 
alliance formation, the main determinants of the partnering firm’s choices to enter a specific joint 
venture and a specific strategic alliance, and the impact of such alliance formation on partnering 
firms’ valuation. The analysis of the price reaction at the announcement of alliance formation 
indicates that market can distinguish between value creating and non-value creating alliances. I 
also provide evidence supporting the argument that alliance formation is not a random process. A 
firm’s choice of entering an alliance designed as diversifying or non-diversifying strategy is a 
result of a complex interaction of external factors and internal needs. Finally, using the change in 
excess value from the year prior to the year following the alliance formation, I document that 
alliance formation negatively impacts the valuation of the single segment partnering firms 
relative to their industry peers, and has no impact on the valuation of multiple segment firms. 
Thus, single segment firms entering alliances are facing the trade-off between the long-term 
benefit provided by the alliance and the immediate costs affecting the activity developed in the 
house. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Over the last decade joint ventures and strategic alliances have become prevalent in the 
business environment, both domestic and international. Alliances are “less-than-arm’s-length” 
relationships that facilitate the merging of complementary interests, the sharing of privileged 
information, and intimate cooperation and collaboration between independent firms. The 
increasing importance of joint ventures and strategic alliances is also reflected by the attention 
received in strategic management and business policy theory, as well as in other research 
disciplines such as (industrial) economics, organization theory, marketing, and finance. 
Analysis of wealth effects around joint ventures provides insight into the broader impact 
of diversification on firm value1. There is a general consensus that market reaction upon alliance 
announcements reflects investors’ perception that joint ventures, as hybrid corporate governance 
mechanisms, are value creating. Empirical studies, including McConell and Nantell (1985), Koh 
and Venkatraman (1991), Balakrishnan and Koza (1993), Mohanram and Nanda (1998), and 
Johnson and Huston (2000) show that partner firms on average earn positive and significant 
abnormal returns when joint ventures are announced, in spite of a high cross-sectional variation. 
In this study, I find evidence consistent with these studies, and I suggest that the cross-sectional 
variation in the stock market reaction is partially explained by different market perceptions 
regarding diversifying versus non-diversifying joint ventures. I classify a joint venture as a 
diversifying strategy whenever its primary SIC code is not shared by any of the business 
                                                 
1 Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Mork, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and Chevalier (2000), among others, provide 
evidence on market reaction at the announcements of diversifying mergers. For market reactions at the 
announcements of nondiversifying corporate events, see John and Ofek  (1995), Desai and Jain (1999), 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Dittmar and Shivdashani (2003) 
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segments of the partnering firms; a non-diversifying joint venture has a primary four-digit SIC 
code shared by at least one of the partnering firms’ business segments. Based on market reaction 
at the announcement of joint ventures, I argue that non-diversifying joint ventures are value 
increasing, whereas diversifying joint ventures do not create value.  
The second issue I address in this study has to do with the factors that help explain a 
firm’s choice between a diversifying or non-diversifying joint venture.  For a sample of firms 
that have undertaken non-diversifying joint ventures, I analyze the degree of overlap between the 
alliance activity and one or more of the existing business segments of the parent firms.  Thus, I 
incorporate in my analysis not only the main factors of joint venture formation that have received 
attention in the alliance literature but also determinants at the division level. Such analysis is 
motivated by Khanna’s (1998) argument that the missing link in understanding why alliances are 
very difficult to manage and at the same time increasingly popular is the interaction between the 
alliance activity and the concurrent activities not governed by the alliance:  
“The individual alliance is thus very much embedded in the broader set of activities pursued by 
the firm (which determine private benefits), an observation similar to Madhok and Tallman’s 
(1998) suggestion that the particular resource that forms the basis of the transaction for the 
alliance is just part of a broader set of resources available to the partnering firms.” 
I find that non-diversifying joint ventures are more likely to be formed by firms operating in 
highly competitive industries and during economic downturns. Such joint ventures are also more 
likely to be designed as strategies for complex joint ventures. Further, I document that younger 
firms and firms with higher growth opportunities are forming joint ventures having a high 
overlap with the activities developed in the house.  
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Using a sample spanning 1991-1996, I analyze whether joint venture formation favorably 
affects the valuation of the partner firms relative to their industry counterparts. I use Berger and 
Ofek’s (1995) excess value measure of firm value, and test whether there is a significant change 
in excess value from the year before to the year after alliance formation. I find that joint venture 
formation negatively affects the valuation of single segment firms relative to their industry 
counterparts, while impact on multiple segment firms is statistically insignificant. For the sub-
sample of multiple segment firms, I also document an insignificant impact of joint venture 
formation on the investment efficiency and capital allocation. 
The market for external capital is very susceptible to the vagaries of economic conditions, 
and firms may have to fall back on their internal capital markets in order to realize their 
investments.  Strategic investments like joint ventures, while arms-length contracts, may still 
have a large impact on internal capital markets as they relocate capital away from internal 
investment opportunities. Thus, while not explicitly diversifying, joint ventures can implicitly 
diversify the capital needs of the partner firms and may therefore have the same impact on firm 
value as explicit diversification strategies.  
I follow up with a similar analysis for strategic alliances. Strategic alliances are informal 
and formal agreements between two or more firms that agree to cooperate in some form of a 
relationship. Several differences between joint ventures and strategic alliances motivate a 
separate analysis of strategic alliances on firm valuation. First, as documented in the literature, 
the initial investment required for the formation of a strategic alliance is, on average, rather small 
compared to the investment necessary for the formation of a joint venture. It is also more 
difficult to measure each partner’s contribution throughout the life of a strategic alliance, and 
therefore more difficult to allocate the benefits obtained from such an alliance. Hence strategic 
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alliances, as evolving relationships, are less formal and more ambiguous. Due to this 
organizational flexibility, the creation of a strategic alliance may in fact add more value to the 
partner firms than a joint venture. I study the market reaction at the announcement of strategic 
alliances and find that the wealth creation around the announcement of strategic alliances is 
primarily confined to the sub-samples of non-diversifying and technological strategic alliances.  
I follow up with the analysis of the main determinants of a firm’s choice of forming a 
diversifying or non-diversifying strategic alliance. As Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2003) 
note, strategic alliances involve the development of new growth opportunities that will enhance 
existing core capabilities. Throughout the life of a strategic alliance there is a continuous 
integration between the existing activities and the evolving redefinition of the firm’s capabilities 
and resources. My analysis indicates that strategic alliances have a short-term negative impact on 
the valuation of the partnering firms, and this effect is mostly confined to the sub-sample of 
single segment firms. 
The reminder of this study is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents a review of the 
extant theoretical and empirical literature on alliances and internal capital allocation around 
various corporate events. In Chapter 3, I present my testable hypotheses for the sample of joint 
ventures, define the variables I use to test these hypotheses, and present the methodology. I also 
present the results of the empirical analyses and the conclusions derived.  In Chapter 4, I describe 
the strategic alliances sample selection criteria, and the testable hypotheses. This chapter also 
details the methodology, and variables utilized to test the hypotheses. Finally, I present the 
results and the conclusions derived. A summary of the main findings concludes the study.   
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Alliances 
2.1.1. Streams of research 
Kale, Singh and Perlmutter (2000) identify three streams of research emerging from the 
academic work on business alliances. The first stream focuses on the motivations for alliance 
formation and includes three rationales: strategic, transaction cost related, and learning related. 
The second stream examines the choice of governance structure in alliances, while the third one 
is primarily concerned with the effectiveness and performance of the alliances.  
 Within the literature on the motives for alliance formation, strategic considerations have 
been mainly discussed in resource-based theories of strategic management. The resource-based 
approach is concerned with the management of a firm’s resources in a manner that increases the 
competitive advantage and consequent rents that can be obtained from such resources (Peteraf, 
1993). First, an alliance provides a way to appropriate scarce resources when the firm lacks the 
capability to develop them in-house or when the development of such capabilities is subject to 
diseconomies of scale, scope, and time as compared to firms that already possess them (Deeds 
and Hill, 1996). Second, an alliance may provide the necessary mechanism for facilitating 
exchange of resources, such as rapid product development and flexible innovation capabilities, 
which are distributed throughout and embedded within the firm itself. Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1996) identify two factors that influence alliance formation. First, firms are more 
likely to form alliances if they are in a vulnerable strategic position and need additional 
resources. They measure strategic position using the number of competitors, the stage of market 
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development, and the strategy of the firm. Second, alliance formation is more likely when firms 
are in strong social positions with a large, experienced and well-connected team management. 
Transaction costs provide another rationale for alliance formation and are mainly 
concerned with the management of transactions in an efficient manner through the least cost 
form of governance, under the assumption of potential opportunism (Williamson (1985, 1991)). 
While the early literature on transaction costs was mainly restricted to the choice between 
markets and hierarchies, later work has extended the analysis by incorporating the choice 
between intermediate forms of governance. Hennart (1993), however, points out that it is 
important to distinguish between methods of organization (price system and hierarchy) and 
economic institutions (market and firms), as there is no one-to-one correspondence between the 
two. Prices and “hierarchy” are methods used to organize economic activities, while markets and 
firms are institutions that use one or both methods to achieve that goal. 
Learning explanations view alliances as a way to accessing and acquiring critical skills or 
capabilities from alliance partners. Increased attention paid to the learning motive has led to the 
identification of several factors affecting the learning process and learning success. Kogut (1988) 
argues that both equity-based alliances and non-equity contractual agreements facilitate the 
transfer of tacit know-how and capabilities, while Mowery, Oxley and Silverman (1996) state 
that equity based governance structures are better suited for learning critical know-how or 
capabilities.  
The second stream of research on alliances focuses on the choice of governance structure. 
The main argument is that opportunistic behavior is more likely to emerge in an uncertain asset-
specific transaction. Therefore, hierarchical mechanisms may restrict opportunism by replacing 
market mechanisms in organizing a transaction. This argument is central to studies on the choice 
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between equity-based arrangements conceived as quasi-hierarchies and non-equity arrangements 
conceived as quasi-markets. According to Williamson (1983), joint ownership better aligns the 
incentives of both parent firms as shared equity represents an exchange of hostages between 
parties.  Osborn and Baughn (1990) analyze the relationship between the technology life cycle 
and governance in alliances. Their argument is that early in the technology life cycle, firms 
might prefer the flexibility of contractual arrangements. Later in the technology life cycle, firms 
might quasi-internalize the benefits of the cooperation through joint venture arrangements. 
Madhok and Tallman (1998) argue that governance modes differ in their potential for value 
creation, where value for the firm can be in the leveraging of internal resources or in the learning 
of new capabilities.  
Performance and effectiveness of the alliances represent the third stream of research in 
the alliance literature. The evidence that has been provided so far is not only limited but also 
contradictory. Several problems are encountered when attempting to measure the performance of 
business alliances. Alliance success can be measured on the project, the relationship, or on the 
firm level. Osborn and Hagedoorn (1997) point out that while success may be revealed on one 
level of analysis, results on other levels might reveal the opposite. 
Early studies on alliance performance used longevity as an indicator of success of the 
alliance. However, more recent studies point out that an alliance that has reached its strategic 
objectives sooner than initially estimated should be considered a success rather than a failure 
(Gulati, 1998).  Another measure of alliance effectiveness is the partners’ level of satisfaction 
with the alliance results. Khanna, et al. (1998) argue that the employment of this indicator might 
be problematic as the level of satisfaction may be asymmetric with one party considering the 
alliance successful while the other partner perceives the alliance unsuccessful. Using a sample of 
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joint venture announcements from 1986 to 1993, Mohanram and Nanda (1998) find that joint 
ventures tend to be announced when the parent firms’ performance is deteriorating, when firms 
are underperforming in the stock market, or when there is a decline in accounting performance.  
Market participants’ perception about the effectiveness of joint ventures is partially 
embedded in price movements at the time of such announcements. The evidence provided by 
empirical studies on the market reaction at the announcements of joint ventures supports the 
argument that alliances are value creating corporate events. The next section summarizes some 
of the relevant studies on this area of research. 
2.1.2. Value gains at the announcements of joint ventures formation 
McConnell and Nantell (1985) investigated the stock returns of US firms that participated 
in domestic joint ventures from 1972 to 1979. Using a sample of 136 joint ventures involving 
210 firms from different industries, they found that joint venture announcements were, on 
average, wealth creating for the shareholders of the participating firms. McConnell and Nantell 
pointed out that the wealth gains from mergers and tender offers could be either from synergy 
gains that arise from the alliances or possibly from the displacement of less-effective 
management. However, as the management of the partner firms remains intact after a joint 
venture has been formed, McConnell and Nantell observed that the most likely source of the 
wealth gains from joint ventures is the synergy hypothesis.  
Using a sample of 239 US firms involved in 175 joint ventures and spanning the years 
from 1972 to 1986, Koh and Venkatraman (1991) examined the market value impact of domestic 
joint ventures in the information technology sector. Their results indicate that joint ventures have 
a greater impact on market value than technology exchanges between firms. They also observed 
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that marketing alliances, supply agreements, and licensing agreements had no significant impact 
on market value of firms.  
Further analysis of the market reaction indicates that joint ventures that strengthen 
existing product-market segments or place new products in existing markets are met with 
significant and positive market reactions, while alliances that develop new customers or enter 
unrelated product-market segments create no such effects. Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) found 
that joint venture announcements, for 64 joint ventures spanning 1974-1977, had a lower impact 
when parent companies were engaged in businesses that were further apart in a technological and 
managerial sense.  
Madhavan and Prescott (1995) analyzed the market reaction at the announcements of 
joint ventures in different industries. Their sample covered 108 joint ventures over the period 
1978-1991. Madhavan and Prescott defined the industry information-processing load as the 
standard deviation among earnings forecasts made by institutional brokers and found that there 
was a U-shaped relationship between the degree of information processing required for an 
investment analyst to understand a joint venture and the venture’s perceived impact on parent 
firms’ market value. Johnson and Huston (2000) extended the analysis of market reaction to the 
announcements of domestic joint ventures by differentiating between horizontal and vertical 
joint ventures. Their results indicate that partners forming horizontal joint ventures share 
synergistic gain, while for vertical joint ventures the gain accrues only for suppliers.  
2.2. Internal Capital Allocation 
2.2.1. Theoretical work  
The problem of capital allocation has received widespread attention in the academic 
world. Two interrelated streams of literature have emerged.  The first stream of literature focuses 
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on the external capital market (the allocation of financing among firms), and the second mainly 
focuses on allocation of capital within individual firms (internal capital market). 
According to Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994), internal capital markets provide the 
capital supplier (corporate headquarters) with total and unconditional control rights; this is 
because the headquarters own the business unit to which capital is allocated. As a consequence, 
internal capital markets present the advantages of improved monitoring and free asset 
redeployability. The cost of internal capital allocation is mainly the reduction in unit managers’ 
entrepreneurial incentives as to the use of such funds.  Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein analyze 
monitoring and entrepreneurial incentives under the assumption that the central headquarters 
oversee only one division. Analysis of asset redeployability is undertaken assuming that the 
headquarters finance multiple related business projects. This study constitutes the starting point 
on the analysis of the authority to reallocate funds within a firm.  
Stein (1997) builds on the evidence developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart 
and Moore (1990) and argues that the authority to redistribute resources across projects, each 
with its own managers, distinguishes headquarters from an equally well-informed external 
provider of capital, such as a bank. Under a two-layer hierarchy, an empire-building manager can 
create value by shifting funds from the “losers” to the “winners” in so-called “winner-picking” 
activities. However, Stein does not incorporate any agency problem, as the divisional managers 
are considered passive.  
Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) provide another perspective to the “winner-picking” benefit 
of integration. In their model, internal capital markets have greater flexibility to redistribute 
funds because they more often bypass the friction associated with external financing. However, 
the flexibility created by internal capital markets may also result in two costly effects: i) strategic 
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disadvantages may be created in product market competition (vulnerability to entry threat) and, 
(ii) the need for external financing may be reduced, thus increasing the extent to which managers 
may engage in overinvestment activities.  
As opposed to the winner picking models, recent theoretical research argues that internal 
capital markets can lead to inefficient capital allocation to individual projects or divisions. 
According to these studies, the central problem associated with internal capital markets is the 
agency conflict between the CEO and divisional managers.  
Following Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts’ (1992) study on influence activities, 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) analyze two divisional managers’ investment decisions when the 
managers may invest either in a value maximizing project or in a project that increases the 
managers’ utility but does not improve the firm value. The only link between the two divisions is 
through the firm’s aggregate budget constraint, so that resources not invested in one division 
must be allocated to the other. By incorporating two levels of agency with three basic agents 
(division managers, a CEO, and outside investors), Scharfstein and Stein not only capture 
divisional rent-seeking behavior but also show that the CEO’s misaligned incentives are reflected 
in the allocation of investment. Unlike a principal, the CEO acting as an agent perceives 
distorted capital allocation as being less costly than additional cash compensation to divisional 
managers. Therefore, headquarters tilt the capital budget towards the weaker division so as to 
mitigate the agency problem with divisional managers. In particular, the division with the weaker 
investment will get more ‘extra’ resources than the division with the better investment because 
this makes the weaker division act more cooperatively in joint production with other divisions 
(“corporate socialism”).  
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Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) address the same problem of corporate socialism, 
but in their model the CEO acts on behalf of the shareholders, and the only agency conflict is 
between the CEO and divisional managers. These authors model two divisions that can each 
invest in either a “defensive” (bad) project or an “efficient” (good) project. The defensive project 
does not maximize NPV of the firm but protects the divisions’ assets from poaching by other 
divisions. The CEO’s transfer of funds from the divisions with the best investment to the 
divisions with the worst is consequently designed to prevent the occurrence of conditions under 
which individual divisions will prefer to invest in the defensive project. 
Aside from the direct effect on the ex-post investment efficiency, the authority to 
reallocate funds from one project to the other has other effects. In Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts 
(1992), there are no investment inefficiencies; the only distortions being the wasteful activities of 
divisional managers so as to obtain a larger share of the capital budget. Meyer, Milgrom, and 
Roberts predict that such distortionary behavior is more of a problem in divisions with poor 
prospects and suggest that the firm may be better off divesting such divisions.  
Along the same lines, Brusco and Panunzi (2000) argue that even when resources are (ex 
post) optimally allocated, the possibility of winner picking reduces managerial incentives ex-
ante. Hence, the redistribution leads to two opposing effects: it creates value and, at the same 
time, rent for the manager of the ex-post less profitable division is reduced.  Brusco and 
Panunzi’s analysis is built on the assumptions that divisional managers always choose effort 
independently from each other and that the value of the multi-divisional firm is independent of 
the ex-ante differences across divisions.  
Gautier and Heider (2002) build on the model developed by Stein (1997) by introducing 
moral hazard and explicit incentive contracting at divisional level. The analysis focuses on the 
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effect of a well functioning internal capital market operated by value maximizing headquarters 
on the divisional managers’ incentives. Under Gautier and Heider’s setting an efficient ex-post 
internal capital market may not be ex-ante efficient. The ex-post reallocation of resources 
negatively affects the production process by creating negative effort externalities among 
divisional managers. As a result, headquarters’ policies on compensation and investment should 
be interrelated. Gautier and Heider predict that, in a multidivisional firm with winner picking, it 
is more difficult to compensate divisional managers if there is redistribution of resources. An 
optimal compensation policy must be sensitive to the performance of the strongest division 
instead of following the performance of the average division. 
In contrast, Stein (2001) argues that the authority to reallocate funds may have positive 
ex-ante effects. The main argument is that divisional managers struggle to provide enough 
positive, verifiable, information to convince the CEO to provide them a larger share of the 
capital budget; hence, managers’ efforts turn out to be productive, rather than wasteful.  
Stein’s (2001) model, however, does not allow for monetary incentives and relies entirely 
on the assumption that the projects are symmetric. Inderst and Laux (2001) relax this assumption 
by allowing for project asymmetry and include monetary incentives. Their model also allows for 
contracting on the allocation of funds. Such contracting may yield several potential advantages 
for firms. First, managerial incentives are improved when divisional capital allocation is 
sensitive to the productivity of investment. Second, under contracting it may be optimal to bias 
capital allocation towards one project in order to take into account different incentive effects for 
different managers. If this capital allocation proves not to be ex-post optimal, it can be 
renegotiated. While distorted capital allocation increases managers’ incentives, they only survive 
renegotiation in integrated firms. 
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Inderst and Muller (2002) examine the role of headquarters when internal and external 
capital markets are tied together. They compare the optimal contracting under “decentralized 
borrowing” (outside investors and individual project managers) with contracting under 
“centralized borrowing” (outside investors and headquarters). Centralization provides both 
benefits and costs. On the one hand, headquarters can use excess liquidity from high cash-flow 
projects to buy continuation rights for low cash-flow projects, thus relaxing financial constraints 
on individual divisions.  On the other hand, this allows divisional managers to finance 
investments without returning to the external capital markets. That is, internal capital markets 
provide headquarters with the ability to create value and, at the same time, headquarters are 
protected from fully relinquishing the value gains to external investors. 
In summary, the question of whether internal capital markets are used for an efficient 
allocation of capital across division is subject of future inquires. Future studies should consider 
the role of internal capital markets at the initiation of a cooperative alliance as well as throughout 
the life of such alliances. 
2.2. Empirical evidence  
The empirical literature on internal capital market efficiency is a part of a broader body 
of work as to the impact of diversification on the shareholder value. Most of the evidence, both 
from domestic data and from other countries, is unfavorable to diversification and especially so 
in the case of unrelated diversification. According to many studies, the majority of firms 
involved in unrelated diversification have been valued at a substantial discount relative to 
focused firms. This notion of a “diversification discount”, first developed by Lang and Stulz 
(1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995), denotes the difference between the value of a diversified 
company and the sum of the imputed values of the stand-alone (individual) segments of the 
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company. The source and interpretation of the diversification discount, known also as “negative 
excess value”, has been the subject of debate for many scholars.  
One of the explanations for the diversification discount, developed in agency cost 
models, is that the diversification discount is a consequence of investment distortions that arise 
due to disparity in investment opportunities across divisions. Lamont (1997) found that 
investment in non-oil divisions of petroleum companies fell when the cash flow of the oil 
divisions decreased dramatically following the 1986 decline in oil prices. Lamont hypothesized 
that when the companies were financially constrained, the investments of single divisions 
became dependent on the success of other divisions operating in unrelated industries, thereby 
suggesting that diversified firms reallocate capital across divisions. However, Shin and Stulz 
(1998) found that divisions with better investment opportunities do not necessarily have priority 
in the allocation of funds. Shin and Stulz interpreted their results as evidence of internal capital 
markets failing to reallocate resources in an efficient manner. Rajan et al. (2000) found that 
industry-adjusted investment of higher-q divisions within conglomerates is low compared to the 
industry-adjusted investment of lower-q divisions and concluded that this difference is driven by 
cross-subsidization. These authors argue that cross-subsidization is more pronounced when 
larger divisions have high growth opportunities and those of smaller divisions are lower. 
On the other side of the debate, some recent studies have revealed at least two potential 
sources of bias undermining the previous conclusions. Whited (2001) has argued that Tobin’s q 
is a poor proxy for investment opportunities (observable measures of Tobin’s q may diverge 
substantially from unobservable marginal q), and that the replication of some of the previous 
studies, using measurement error consistent estimators (Erikson and Whited, 2000), shows no 
evidence for cross-subsidization.  Whited has pointed out that if an inaccurate proxy for 
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divisional investment opportunities is used, cash flow in one division may appear to be a 
significant explanatory variable for investment in another division simply because the investment 
opportunities may be correlated across divisions. Chevalier (2000) has shown that investment 
patterns attributable to value destroying cross-subsidization are apparent in the pairs of merging 
firms prior to their mergers. Chevalier analyzed the investment policies of a sample of 
diversifying mergers (i.e., mergers between two firms with no business segments in any common 
2-digit SIC codes in the year prior to the merger in which the two merging firms became two 
divisions of the diversified firm). As the two firms operated independently prior to the merger, 
no cross-subsidization of investment between the two firms could possibly take place. 
Chevalier’s empirical analysis reveals that one partner firm’s cash flow is predicted by the other 
partner’s investment prior to the merger. Targets with lower investment opportunities than the 
acquirers’ appear to appear to have a higher industry adjusted investment expenditures. On the 
other hand, Fan and Lang (2000) show that two digit SIC-based measures are likely to exclude 
some instances where two business units are strategically related, for example the oil-refining 
(SIC 29) and chemical (SIC 28) businesses are classified as unrelated at the two-digit level, when 
in fact these industries are both vertically related and complementary.  
As a result of these critiques, several recent studies have overcome the aforementioned 
biases by developing new measures of the efficiency of internal capital markets. They have also 
focused their analyses on specific settings designed to alleviate the measurement errors present 
in previous studies. For example, Billet and Mauer (2001) examine the link between the excess 
value and the value of the internal capital market of a diversified firm and develop a measure of 
internal capital market that separately accounts for subsidies and transfers and the relative 
efficiency of the resource flows. Furthermore, they condition their measurement on whether the 
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segments receiving subsidies would be financially constrained as stand-alone firms. Billet and 
Mauer’s results show no reliable statistical evidence that their excess value measure is 
significantly related to the overall internal capital market measure. Nevertheless, a deeper 
analysis indicates that efficient and inefficient subsidies to financially constrained segments 
significantly increase value, while inefficient transfers (dollars flows away from segments having 
good relative investment opportunities) significantly decrease value. The authors conclude that 
the key benefit of internal capital markets is the ability to fund good investment opportunities of 
segments that would be financially constrained if they were stand-alone firms.  
Another way to circumvent the methodological critiques of Chevalier (2000) and Whited 
(2001) is to analyze changes in investment policy around a corporate restructuring event. 
Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2000) document that the investment behavior of a spun-off 
division becomes more sensitive to industry q and that this effect is more pronounced for 
divisions in low-q industries whose investment is sharply cut following the spin-off. Burch and 
Nanda (2003) relate the value gains from spin-offs to attributes of the diversified firm’s internal 
capital market. Their results show that the improvement in excess value following a spin-off is 
related to the segments’ investment pattern moving closer to those of the stand-alone firms.   
Ahn and Denis (2003) examine the total impact of the spin-off on investment policy and find that 
the sample firm invest inefficiently prior to the spin-off and significantly improve investment 
efficiency following the spin-off.  They also find that the increase in the investment efficiency is 
related to the increase in firm value.  
The above-mentioned empirical studies analyze firms’ valuation and the efficiency of 
internal capital markets around either a diversifying or a non-diversifying corporate event. The 
formation of a business alliance constitutes an ideal empirical setting for the analysis of the 
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change in discount and efficiency of internal capital allocation, as such alliances are designed as 
diversifying corporate events for some firms and non-diversifying for others.  
My dissertation contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I use a new criterion of 
classifying alliances into diversifying and non-diversifying strategies.  I document that a firm’s 
decision to enter a diversifying or a non-diversifying alliance is not a random process and is the 
result of a close interaction of internal and external factors. Second, I provide evidence on the 
immediate impact of an alliance on the firm valuation. Such analysis provides additional 
evidence on whether diversifying and non-diversifying strategies result in value creation or value 
destruction. 
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3. Essay 1: 
Impact of Joint Ventures on the Capital Allocation and Efficiency of Internal 
Investments in Partner Firms 
 
In this essay I examine the impact of the formation of joint ventures on partner firm 
valuation. I analyze the market reactions at the announcement of joint ventures for a sample 
spanning 1991 to 1999. I further analyze the main determinants of a firm’s choice to enter either 
a diversifying or a non-diversifying joint venture. Finally, I investigate the immediate impact of 
the initiation of a joint venture on the valuation of the partner firms relative to their industry 
counterparts by examining excess values. 
3.1. Hypotheses  
3.1.1. Valuation effect at the announcement of joint ventures 
The extant literature documents differing market reactions at the announcement of 
corporate diversification events and focus preserving or focus increasing corporate events. It is 
widely accepted that focus increasing or preserving events are value enhancing, while 
diversifying changes are met with negative market reactions at the announcement2. Recent 
evidence from the banking sector supports these conclusions as well (DeLong, 2001).  Previous 
empirical event studies unanimously agree that market reaction at the announcement of a joint 
venture reflects investors’ perception that these hybrid forms of corporate governance are value 
increasing. However, Mohanram and Nanda (1998) posit that despite the favorable average 
                                                 
2 For details, see Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarell (1995), John and Ofek 
(1995), Krishnaswami and  Subramaniam (1999), Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) 
 20
effect, cross-sectional variation in the cumulative abnormal returns should be further 
investigated.   
 In this study, I define a diversifying joint venture as a joint venture having no degree of 
overlap with the parent company, i.e. when none of the partner company’s business segments 
shares the same four-digit SIC code with the joint venture. The remaining joint ventures are 
classified as non-diversifying. As joint ventures are considered hybrid forms of corporate 
governance that share common characteristics with mergers, I hypothesize that: 
H1: Non-diversifying joint ventures enhance stockholder value upon announcement, 
while diversifying joint ventures do not create value and they may even destroy value. 
 3.1.2. Determinants of a choice of diversifying versus non-diversifying joint ventures  
In what follows, I consider several variables that may influence a firm’s choice of 
forming a diversifying or a non-diversifying joint venture. These variables measure the parent 
firm’s industry concentration, economic conditions, complexity of the joint venture, ownership 
and control, and firm age. Below, I discuss each of these variables in turn and give the main 
arguments behind their predicted impact on a firms’ decision to initiate a specific type of joint 
venture. 
i) Industry Characteristics: One of the central arguments in the industrial organization 
literature is that a firm’s profitability is determined by the degree of concentration in that 
particular industry. Porter (1980), for example, argues that differences in profitability reflect the 
differing barriers to entry across industries. According to Kogut (1991), firms facing the decision 
to enter new markets, and in particular new business not related to their existing activities, may 
find the initiation of a joint venture a promising start; a joint venture with an incumbent partner 
firm can be regarded as an acquisition of the right to expand in the future in that specific 
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industry. However, incumbent firms in profitable and highly concentrated industries may not 
find joint ventures attractive as such ventures would cost them some market share. Firms in 
highly competitive industries on the other hand should benefit from sharing scale economies and 
coordinating joint management, through non-diversifying joint ventures. As well, as suggested 
by Eisenhart and Schoonhoven (1996), firms in highly competitive industries have vulnerable 
positions because product differentiation is difficult. Joint venture formation should enable such 
firms to strengthen their relative position in the market. Based on these arguments, I hypothesize 
that: 
H2a: Partner firms in highly competitive industries are more likely to form non-
diversifying joint ventures. 
ii) Economic conditions: Maksimovic and Phillips (2000) analyzed the asset sales and 
merger activities of a sample of manufacturing companies from 1974 to 1992. Their results 
indicate that firms differ in their ability to exploit assets, and that the comparative advantages of 
firms lie in their main industries One of the main factors influencing asset reallocation outside 
such firm boundaries is the economic business cycle. In particular, there is clear evidence that 
fewer assets are reallocated in a recession, presumably reflecting the reduced expectations of 
profitability outside the firms’ most familiar businesses when the economy is weak. Moreover, 
Coase (1937) argues that internal organization costs are higher the greater the dissimilarity 
between the activities subject to the transaction and the existing activities developed by the firm. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H2b: Diversifying joint ventures are less likely to be formed during a recession.  
iii) Joint venture complexity: Several studies have documented differences between 
technological and non-technological alliances (Teece, 1986; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; 
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Hagedoorn, 1993; Das, Sen, and Sengupta, 1998). An alliance is classified as technological if the 
alliance contract involves R&D activities, technology sharing, or product development.  
Technological alliances are subject to severe moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
because the true value of the output is difficult to assess accurately. This problem is more 
pronounced in R&D joint ventures, in which partnering firms must transfer R&D know-how 
across organizational boundaries. On the other hand, the moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems are partially mitigated when the partnering firms already conduct activity that at least 
partially overlaps the joint venture. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H2c: Technological joint ventures are more likely to be formed as non-diversifying 
strategies. 
iv) Ownership and control: It has long been recognized that joint ventures exhibit an 
intriguing ownership pattern according to which equal or almost equal stakes of the joint venture 
are allocated to the partner firms. This clustering of ownership around the 50-50 equity 
allocations contradicts theoretical modeling that calls for optimal asymmetric ownership 
structures (Darrough and Stoughton, 1989; Belleflamme and Bloch, 2000). Moreover, potential 
disagreements between partners who possess equal shares of the joint venture may result in 
permanent legal deadlock.  
  Recent evidence has shed some light on this puzzle. Hauswald and Hege (2004) show 
that joint control, 50 plus one share, and outright majority control can coexist in equilibrium and 
can be optimal depending on the attributes of the partner firms. In particular, equal ownership 
offers protection against rent-seeking activities when such protection is relevant, 50 plus one 
share equally splits the returns of the project while allocating control to the company that 
provides the more valuable resources, and outright majority ownership is optimal when the 
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partners are very dissimilar. As diversifying joint ventures are more likely to bring together two 
dissimilar partner firms, I therefore hypothesize that: 
H2d: The partner firm forming a diversifying joint venture is more likely to be granted 
the outright majority ownership. 
v) Firm’s age: Newly formed companies face the critical task of gaining acceptance 
while protecting their proprietary assets. Accordingly, a young firm may enter into a non-
diversifying joint venture for two reasons. First, since partnering with established firms provides 
a positive signal of product quality, younger firms gain market recognition or legitimacy when 
entering into an alliance within its core activities (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Stuart, 
2000). Second, younger firms may be controlled by their founders who are less likely to enter 
new lines of business outside their particular area of expertise (Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997).  
A mature firm with a well-established reputation, on the other hand, is more likely to concentrate 
its resources on its own core activities and form alliances with firms that support peripheral 
activities (Stopford and Wells, 1972). Each of these arguments suggests the hypothesis that: 
H2e: A younger firm is more likely to form a non-diversifying joint venture with a high 
overlap with its core activities, while a mature firm is more likely to form a joint 
venture within its peripheral activities or even a diversifying joint venture. 
vi) Growth opportunities: According to the resource-based theory of joint ventures, one 
of the primary driving forces of an alliance formation is a firm’s need for resources. As opposed 
to an acquisition, a joint venture provides the benefits of attaining know-how and capabilities 
from partner firms while avoiding the cost of acquiring or managing the associated assets 
(Williamson, 1991). However, for a joint venture to be profitable, the benefit of cost sharing and 
learning through the joint venture should be higher than the cost of protecting the proprietary 
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assets within the alliance. The risk of losing proprietary core capabilities and skills increases 
with the degree of overlap between joint venture’s activity and partner firms’ core activities. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H2f: A firm with high growth options and lower operating performance is more likely to 
form a non-diversifying joint venture that strongly overlaps with the firm’s existing 
activities. 
vii) Relative efficiency of the focal segment: 
For non-diversifying joint ventures, two opposite arguments support the relative 
efficiency of the focal segment (the segment whose activity is duplicated by the joint venture) as 
one of the reasons behind joint venture formation. 
Stopford and Wells (1972) argue that diversified firms involved in a joint venture on 
peripheral lines of business do not desire as high a degree of control over these lines as they do 
for their principal business lines.  Mantecon and Chatefield (2004) posit that the formation of 
some joint ventures constitutes an optimal temporary arrangement designed as the first step 
towards a future asset sale3. Therefore, a firms’ choice of creating a non-diversifying joint 
venture may be linked to the investment efficiency of the firm’s focal segment. If a firm fails to 
operate one of its peripheral activities efficiently, a non-diversifying joint venture may the 
optimal vehicle towards the complete sale of the weak division at a future date.  
Kogut (1988) observes that a joint venture is encouraged if i) “one or both firms desire to 
acquire the other’s organizational know-how” or if ii) “one firm wishes to maintain 
organizational capability while benefiting from another’s current knowledge or cost advantage”.  
                                                 
3 An illustrating example is provided by the formation of a joint venture between Phillips and Whirlpool.  In 1989, 
in an effort to reorganize its diversified operation, Phillips offered its appliance division for sale. While negotiations 
for a complete asset sale failed, the two companies had reached an agreement to create a joint venture. Whirlpool 
acquired 53% stake in the appliance business, while Phillips maintained 47 % of the ownership. Two years later, 
Whirlpool purchased the remaining 47 % of the joint venture. 
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If the joint venture formation brings together two partners with different abilities in managing 
assets, a transfer of expertise between the two throughout the joint venture’s life is more likely. 
Therefore, a non-diversifying joint venture provides the partner firms with the opportunity of 
sharing the necessary expertise in managing assets. As a result, the efficiency of the segment 
whose activity is duplicated by the joint venture is implicitly improved. Based on these 
arguments, I hypothesize that: 
H2g:  A firm is more likely to form a non-diversifying joint venture with a low degree of 
overlap when the investment ratio of the focal segment is low. 
3.1.3. Change in excess value around joint venture formation 
The third issue I examine in this essay is the effect of a joint venture on the valuation of 
the partner firms relative to the industry. Lang, Poulson, and Stulz (1994) argue that asset sales 
are often an expedient financing mechanism when access to external capital is limited. Dittmar 
and Shivdashani (2003) empirically prove that asset sales relax external financial constraints and 
allow firms to undertake valuable investments that would otherwise be foregone. They also show 
that there is a statistical significant change in excess value of the firms divesting some of their 
assets, as market participants have the ability to recognize their positive effects on the firm as a 
whole. On the other hand, Gertner et al. (1994) has argued that a diversified firm with an 
efficient internal capital allocation will avoid transactions in the asset markets (“external 
liquidation”) by redeploying assets internally (“internal liquidation”). According to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992), asset sales can lead to low sales prices when firms are operating within depressed 
industries characterized by a very low liquidity of asset markets. Therefore, diversified firms 
operating in these industries are more likely to redeploy assets internally rather than divesting 
them through sales. Joint venture formation thus allows the partner firms to avoid transacting in 
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the asset markets when market conditions are unfavorable and provides the partner firm the 
opportunity of sharing the necessary resources for undertaking valuable investments.  
 However, in some instances valuable resources may be diverted from internal investment 
opportunities, as firms may have to fall back on their internal capital markets in order to initiate 
and continue investments in the newly created entity. This problem is exacerbated for single 
segment firms, as the capital needed for investment is diverted from their only division.  
Khanna et al. (1998) have argued that the degree of overlap between alliance scope and 
partner firm scope determines the amount of resources that firms allocate to learning from their 
alliance partner Therefore, a joint venture having the same scope as one of the peripheral 
segments or whenever is designed as a diversifying strategy requires a relatively small amount of 
investment, and thus impacts internal resources by a lesser extent. Along the same lines, Singh 
and Mitchell (1996) show that the performance of the business unit involved in the alliance 
becomes closely related to the change in the strategy of the business partner. Their results show 
that focal business units face increased risk of dissolution if the collaborative business unit shuts 
down, is divested, or forms a collaborative relationship with a new partner. One implication of 
their findings is that, after the alliance formation, the focal business unit becomes more 
dependent on the strategy developed by the partner and less dependent on the strategy of its 
partner firm. Thus, hypothesis 3 is stated as follows: 
H3: A joint venture negatively affects the excess value of a single segment firm, and is 
less likely to have any impact on the excess value of a multiple segment firm. 
3.1.4. Impact of joint ventures on internal capital markets 
Using a sample of multiple segment firms, Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) have 
documented a positive relationship between an excess value metric, as developed by Berger and 
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Ofek (1995), and the relative value added by allocation, as measure of investment efficiency of 
internal capital markets. In other words, the valuation of multiple segment firms relative to their 
industry partially reflects the efficiency of internal capital markets. The results of Rajan, Servaes, 
and Zingales have been confirmed by several other empirical studies. One of these studies, Ahn 
and Denis (2003), shows that a corporate restructuring through a spin-off leads to an 
improvement in the investment efficiency of a firm from one year prior to one year after the 
spin-off. They also find a positive change in the excess value of the firm around the time of the 
announced spin-off and document a positive relationship between changes in excess value and 
change the overall investment efficiency. The results of Ahn and Denis indicate that firms invest 
inefficiently prior to the spin-off and the inefficiency is, to at least some degree, eliminated 
following the spin-off. Using a sample of firms that undertake a business segment divestiture, 
Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) report similar empirical findings. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between the change in excess value and change in 
investment efficiency for multiple segment firms forming joint ventures. 
3.2. Definitions of Variables for Estimation and Methodology 
In this section, I specify the precise variables applied in my empirical estimations and 
describe the statistical methodology I have used to test the above hypotheses. 
3.2.1. Market reaction around joint venture announcements 
In order to analyze the market reaction at the announcement of diversifying and non-
diversifying joint ventures, I employ an event study methodology analogous to the one used by 
Dodd and Warner (1983). The abnormal performance for each firm is estimated using a market 
model that to adjusts for market-wide factors and for risk. For a given firm j, the abnormal return 
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on each of the trading days around the announcement of the joint venture is defined as the 
predicted error, 
( ),ˆˆ                                                mtjjjtjt RRPE βα +−=  
where, 
jtR  = continuously compounded rate of return to firm j at event date t, 
mtR  = continuously compounded rate of return to the CRSP value weighted index at event day t 
The estimation period for the market model begins on day 155 and ends with day 45 
before the day of the announcement. Significance tests performed are based a standardized test 
statistic constructed so as to determine whether the mean abnormal return is significantly 
different from zero. The Z-statistic is normally distributed and controls for the number of 
observations in the estimation period and for the market fluctuations during the event window. 
The presence of outliers with very large standard deviation is indicated by the average CAR and 
Z-statistics having opposite signs. I also perform the binomial test to indicate whether the 
percentage of positive abnormal returns is statistically significant. 
3.2.2. A Firm’s Choice of Entering a Joint Venture as Diversifying or Non-diversifying 
Strategy 
This section presents the Heckman two-stage selection model, which I apply to first 
analyze a firm’s choice between a diversifying and a non-diversifying joint venture (sample 
selection). Second, given that a non-diversifying joint venture has been chosen, I study the main 
factors that explain the degree of overlap between the joint venture and the existing activities 
developed by the partner firms (substantial analysis).  
The equation that determines a firm’s choice between a non-diversifying and a 
diversifying joint venture (sample selection) is: 
 29
iii uwz += γ'*       (1) 
1=iz if and 0 otherwise; 0* >iz
( ) ( )
( ) ( )γ
γ
'
'
10Prob
1Prob
iii
iii
wwz
wwz
Φ−==
Φ==
 
The regression model (substantial analysis) is: 
iii xy εβ += '       (2) 
where is observed when . and iy 1
* =iz iu iε  have a bivariate normal distribution with 
zero means and correlation ρ .  
[ ] ( )γλρσβ ε '',,1 iiiiii wxwxzyE +== , where ( ) ( )( )γγφγλ '
'
'
i
i
i w
ww Φ= .
4
The marginal effects of the regressors on yi consist of two components. The first effect is 
a direct one on the mean of yi , which is . The second effect, an indirect one, is the influence on yi 
of any independent variable appearing in the probability that is positive. This influence is 
directed through the presence of the independent variable in 
*
iz
iλ . 
The full effect of changes in a regressor that appears in both xi and wi on y is 
( ) ( ) iiiiu
u
kk
ik
ii
x
zyE λαλδαδσ
ρσγβ ε −=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=∂
>∂
2
*
  where,
1
. 
The first step of Heckman’s method is to estimate the probit equation (1) by maximum 
likelihood to obtain estimates of γ . For each observation in the selected sample it computes 
 and . The second step consists on estimating the )ˆ(/)ˆ(ˆ '' γγφλ iii ww Φ= )ˆˆ(ˆˆ 'γλλδ iiii w−= β  and 
eρσβλ = by least squares regression of y on x and . In my analysis, the dependent variable in λˆ
                                                 
4 For details see Green (2002)  
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the probit analysis (selection model) is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm is 
entering a joint venture as a non-diversifying strategy. In the second step of the Heckman 
procedure (substantial analysis), an OLS regression analysis of the firms and divisional 
characteristics on the degree of overlap between the joint venture activity and the existing 
business segments of the firm is performed. In this substantial analysis I use the selection bias 
control factor Lambda as an additional independent variable. This factor reflects the effect of all 
the unmeasured characteristics, which are related to diversifying/non-diversifying decision; the 
coefficient of Lambda catches part of the effect of these characteristics that is related to the 
degree of overlap between the joint venture activity and existing business segments. In summary, 
the coefficient of Lambda indicates whether there is selection bias and what the direction of this 
bias is. A significant positive coefficient indicates that firms entering a non-diversifying joint 
venture have unmeasured characteristics, which are positively related to the degree of overlap 
between joint venture activity and existing activities undertaken by the partner firm.  
The determinants of a firm’s decision to form a joint venture as a diversifying versus 
non-diversifying strategy are as follows: a) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measured as 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index= , where ∑
=
N
i
i
1
2α iα  represents the market share of firm i within an 
industry with N firms; b) Technology dummy that takes value 1 if the contract specifies either 
one or a combination of R&D, technology or product development; c) GDP is the real growth in 
the Gross Domestic Product; d) Ownership is an indicator that takes value 1 if the firm has more 
than fifty percent of the ownership in the joint venture; e) LnAge defined as the natural logarithm 
of the difference between the month when the partner firm appears for the first time on CRSP 
and the month of the joint venture formation. 
 31
The determinants of investment in a non-diversifying joint venture, i.e. a joint venture 
with the same SIC code with the one of the existing business segments are as follows: a) LnAge; 
b) Relative efficiency ratio of the focal segment, i.e. the existing business segment having the 
same SIC as the joint venture, defined as the difference between the ratio of cash flow and sales 
for the focal segment and the median ratio of cash flow and sales for the industry divided by the 
median ratio of cash flow and sales for the industry; c) a growth indicator dummy set to 1 when 
market-to-book market to book ratio of the firm is higher than 1 and 0 otherwise; d) Cash flow 
from operations is cash flow generated from all operating activities and is measured as a ratio 
relative to the total assets of the firm; e) Operating income is sales minus cost of goods sold and 
other expenses, before depreciation and amortization, and is measures as a ratio to total assets of 
the firm. Following Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), I use the ratio of the firms’ market 
value of assets to book value of assets as a proxy for growth options in the firm’s investment 
opportunity set. Market value equals the book value of assets minus the book value of equity 
plus the market value of equity. 
3.2.3. Measure of relative valuation 
In measuring the relative valuation of the partner firms I follow Berger and Ofek (1995), 
and define the excess value as follows: 
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where V is the sum of market value of equity and book value of assets less the book value 
of equity and deferred taxes, I(V) is the imputed firm value,  is the segment i’s assets, 
is segment i’s sales;  and  are the assets and sales 
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multipliers calculated as the median of the single segment firms in the same 3-digit SIC code 
industry. A negative excess value indicates that the firm is valued at a discount, while a positive 
value indicates that the firm is valued at a premium. I examine the excess value of the firms that 
enter into a joint venture in the year before and the year after the joint venture formation.  
3.2.4. Measures of internal capital markets’ efficiency 
I use three proxies to measure the allocation efficiency of the internal capital market. The 
first measure is the relative value added by allocation (RVA) as initially developed by Rajan et 
al. (2000). 
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reflects the overall funds available to a diversified firm 
relative to its single segment peers and is subtracted from the industry-adjusted investment ratio 
in order to correct for potential differences in availability of total capital that should not count as 
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transfer. Finally, )( qq j − categorizes those segments that have above average investment 
opportunities. In summary, a positive RVA reflects an efficient ICM because capital is 
transferred to segments with above average investment opportunities; hence the firm invests 
more than single segment industry counterparts in those segments. 
The second measure of the efficiency of internal allocation that I use, as developed 
initially by Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) is q sensitivity of investment. 
FirmSales
FirmSales
FirmCapex
Sales
CapexqqSales
j
n
j
jj ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−∑
=
)(
1
    (6) 
where Capex is the capital expenditures of the segment, FirmCapex is the capital 
expenditure of the firm, is the imputed Tobin’s q of segment j and jq q is the segment sales-
weighted ’s of the firm. This measure is positive if a segment with an above average q has an 
investment ratio above the firm’s average; hence, q sensitivity indicated whether the firm has 
invested relatively more in the high-q segments of the firm and relatively less in the low-q 
segments. 
jq
The third measure I use, developed by Peyer (2002), is the cash flow sensitivity. While 
similar to the q investment sensitivity, the cash flow sensitivity provides the advantage of relying 
on individual segment information, rather than on imputed values. 
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where is the cash flow to sales ratio and jcf fc  is the average cash flow to sales ratio of 
the firm. 
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Similar to the other two measures, cash flow sensitivity indicates whether the firm has 
invested relatively more in segments generating higher cash flows and relatively less in segments 
generating cash flows below the firm’s average. 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Data and summary statistics 
Using a sample spanning 1991-1999, I examine the market reaction to the 
announcements of joint venture formations, the main determinants of a firm’s choice to form a 
joint venture as a diversifying and non-diversifying strategy and whether joint venture formation 
favorably affects the valuation of the partner firms relative to their industry counterparts. The list 
of domestic joint ventures comes from Thompson Financial Security database (SDC- Joint 
Ventures/Alliances). Besides the announcement date and the effective date, the SDC reports 
other information about the joint ventures, such as: name of the partner firms, main SIC code for 
the joint ventures and each partner firm, and type of the joint ventures, among others.  It also 
reports a brief description of the activity of the joint venture. In order to test H1 through H2g, I 
select only joint ventures formed by two publicly traded firms with available financial data on 
Compustat both at the firm and business segment level one year prior to the joint venture 
formation. I start with an initial sample of 545 joint ventures formed by publicly traded industrial 
partner firms. I select only those joint ventures where both firms have financial data on the 
Compustat Industry Segment file one year before the joint venture formation. This leaves a total 
of 239 joint ventures initiated by 478 partner firms between 1991 and 1999. 
I classify a joint venture as a diversifying corporate strategy when none of partner’s 
business segments share the same four digits SIC code with the primary SIC of the joint venture. 
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Similarly, a non-diversifying joint venture implies that at least one of the business segments of 
the partner firm is the same with the one of joint venture.  
Figure 1 
On June 10, 1997, AAR Corp and General Electric Co formed a joint venture to manufacture and supply turbine 
engines.  The new company, Turbine Engine Asset Management LLC, was to supply CF6-6, -50, and -80A engine 
parts to aviation customers worldwide.  It operates out of Wood Dale, Illinois.  Financial details of the agreement 
were not disclosed. 
                              
General Electric Co.         AAR CORP 
(SIC code 9997)                                (SIC code 5080) 
 
     Joint Venture 
Turbine Engine Asset Management LLC 
                          (SIC code 3724) 
 
General Electric Co. Turbine Engine Asset 
Management LLC 
AAR CORP 
Business segments 
 
SIC code 
 
SIC code 
 
Business segments 
 
SIC code 
 
Aircraft Engine 3724 3724  Industrial services 5080 
Major Appliances 3630    
Materials 3089    
Technical products 3845    
Broadcasting 4833    
Financing 6141    
Specialty insurance 6331    
Other 6799    
Power generation 3511    
Industrial products and services 3640    
 
Figure 1 illustrates an example of a joint venture formation as a non-diversifying strategy 
for one of the partner firms and as a diversifying strategy for the other. The newly created entity 
(Turbine Engine Asset Management LLC) has the same primary SIC code with the Aircraft 
Engine segment of General Electric Co. I classify this joint venture as a diversifying strategy for 
the AAR CORP and as a non-diversifying strategy for General Electric Co.  
Table I presents the annual distribution of the joint ventures. The minimum number of 
joint ventures formations in the sample is 28 during the year of 1992 and the maximum number 
is 42 during the year of 1997. Across the years, the annual percentage number of joint ventures is 
similar for diversifying and non-diversifying sub-samples. Panel B shows the distribution of the 
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partner firms across industries. There is a high representation of manufacturing firms, accounting 
for 46.65% of the total sample. However, the distribution of non-diversifying versus diversifying 
joint ventures across industries is similar. 
 
 
Table I 
The sample consists on 360 firms that initiate joint ventures with no overlap with the concurrent activities 
(diversifying joint ventures) and 118 firms that initiate joint ventures with overlap with one of the concurrent 
activities (non-diversifying joint ventures). 
 
Panel A: Partner firms by year 
 Diversifying JV 
 
Non-diversifying JV 
 
Year N % N % 
1991 
 
43 11.94 19 16.10 
1992 
 
19 5.28 9 7.63 
1993 
 
30 8.33 8 6.78 
1994 
 
38 10.56 12 10.17 
1995 
 
43 11.94 19 16.10 
1996 
 
51 14.17 17 14.41 
1997 
 
65 18.06 19 16.10 
1998 
 
37 10.28 9 7.63 
1999 
 
34 9.44 6 5.08 
Total 360 100 118 100 
 
Panel B: Partner firms by industry 
 Diversifying JV 
 
Non-diversifying JV 
 
Industry (2 digit SIC codes) N % N % 
Agriculture, Mining, Constructions (01-17) 
 
38 10.56 20 16.95 
Manufacturing (20-39) 
 
172 47.78 51 43.22 
Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas, 
and Sanitary Service (40-49) 
49 13.61 17 14.41 
Wholesale and Retail Trade (50-59) 
 
23 6.39 6 5.08 
General Services and Others (70-99) 
 
78 21.66 24 20.34 
Total 360 100 118 100 
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Table II shows the means and medians of selected variables and the non-parametric test 
for differences in means for partner firms entering diversifying and non-diversifying joint 
ventures.  
 
Table II 
The sample consists on 118 firms that initiate non-diversifying joint ventures and 360 firms that initiate non-
diversifying joint ventures. Age is the number of months between the first listing of the partner firm on CRSP and 
the date of the announcement.  Market to book ratio is the ratio of the market value to the book value of assets. 
Research and development is equal to research and development expenditures divided by total sales. Debt ratio is 
defined as debt over book value of assets where debt is the long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. Cash flow 
from operations is cash flow generated from all operating activities and is measured as a ratio relative to the total 
assets of the firm. Operating income is sales minus cost of goods sold and other expenses, before depreciation and 
amortization, and is measures as a ratio to total assets of the firm. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated as 
Herfindahl Index=  where ∑
=
N
i
i
1
2α iα  represents the market share of firm i within an industry with N firms. The last 
column shows the significance level of Mann-Whitney test for the differences in mean. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Non-diversifying 
Joint Ventures 
 
Diversifying 
Joint Ventures 
 
p-value 
Age 283.38 
(172.43) 
 
308.39 
(206.85) 
0.365 
 
Market to Book ratio 1.864 
(1.234) 
 
1.917 
(1.277) 
0.824 
 
Research and Development 1.142 
(0.040) 
 
1.352 
(0.044) 
0.761 
 
Debt ratio 0.260 
(0.230) 
 
0.249 
(0.231) 
0.893 
 
Cash Flow from Operating Activities 0.088 
(0.127) 
 
0.112 
(0.132) 
0.379 
 
Operating Income 0.062 
(0.093) 
 
0.070 
(0.086) 
0.780 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.230 
(0.164) 
 
0.273 
(0.187) 
0.130 
 
Number of firms 118 360  
 
Firms entering diversifying joint ventures seem to be, on average, more mature, have a 
higher market to book ratio, and have a lower debt ratio than firms entering non-diversifying 
joint ventures. However, none one of the differences in their means is statistically significant at 
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the conventional levels. Because firms are not required to report research and development 
expenses unless they exceed 1% of the sales, the research and development ratio cannot be 
calculated for all the firms in the sample. The mean and median for this variable are reported for 
72 non-diversifying joint ventures and 234 diversifying joint ventures.5 The percentage of firms 
forming a non-diversifying joint venture where they have a minority of ownership is higher than 
that of firms forming a diversifying joint venture. Out of 118 firms that form a non-diversifying 
joint venture, only 18 firms (15.25%) have a minority share of ownership in the joint venture 
compared to 32 firms (8.89%) out of 360 firms for diversifying joint ventures. Although not 
included in the table, I find a higher proportion of technological joint ventures formed as a non-
diversifying strategy than diversifying strategy (52.54% versus 43.33%).  
3.3.2.  Market reaction around the announcement of joint venture formations 
I investigate the market abnormal return for the whole sample of firms entering joint 
ventures, as well as for the diversifying and non-diversifying joint ventures sub-samples. 
Consistent with McConnell and Nantell (1985) and all the following event studies investigating 
the market reaction around the announcement of joint ventures formation, I find statistical 
significant positive abnormal returns for the whole sample. Table III summarizes the abnormal 
returns over different time intervals around the date of the announcement. I obtain a significant 
mean two–day cumulative abnormal return of 1.02% for the event window (-1, 0), and a 
significant mean five days abnormal return of 1.30% for the event window (-2, +2). The 
binomial test indicates that the percentage of positive abnormal returns is significant for both 
event windows (-1, 0) and (-2, +2). The results are consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 
1, namely that the positive market reaction to the announcements of joint ventures formation is 
                                                 
5 Following Campa and Kedia (2003), I replace all the missing observations with zero and compute the medians for 
the two sub-samples.  The difference remains statistically insignificant at the conventional levels. 
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confined to the sub-sample of non-diversifying joint ventures. Panel B shows that the 
announcements of diversifying joint ventures are met with a positive insignificant market 
reaction. Woolridge and Snow (1990) also document that there is an insignificant market 
reaction to the announcements of joint ventures as means of expansion in new markets with old 
products, which already might have been anticipated by investors. Panel C presents the market 
reaction for the announcements of non-diversifying joint ventures. I document a significant mean 
two-day cumulative abnormal return of 2.44% for the event window (-1, 0), and a significant 
mean five-day cumulative abnormal return of 3.52% for the event window (-2, +2).  
Table III 
Cumulative abnormal returns over selected intervals for a sample of 478 firms that announced joint ventures 
formation during the period 1991-1999. The sample consists on 360 firms that initiate diversifying joint ventures 
and 118 firms that initiate non-diversifying joint venture. Joint ventures are identified from the SDC database. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 155-day period ending 45 days 
before the announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted index is used in the market model to compute betas. The 
abnormal returns are cumulated in the intervals. The percentage positive is the ratio of the number of firms with 
positive abnormal returns to the total number of firms. The generalized sign test is used to test the significance of the 
percentage of firms with positive abnormal returns.  *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: All Partner firms 
Interval Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample 
 
 Mean% Median % z-statistic Generalized sign test 
-5 to –1 
 
0.39 -0.33            -0.46 48 
-2 to +2 
 
1.30 0.14    2.18**    52** 
-1 to 0 
 
1.02 0.24      3.21***    53** 
+1 to +5 
 
          -0.43            -0.31 -1.51* 47 
 
Panel B: Partner firms for diversifying joint ventures 
Interval Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample 
 
 Mean% Median % z-statistic Generalized sign test 
-5 to –1 
 
0.35 -0.10 0.01 50 
-2 to +2 
 
0.56 -0.14 0.20 48 
-1 to 0 
 
0.55 0.10 1.23 49 
+1 to+ 5 
 
          -0.41            -0.53   -1.72**   45* 
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(table III continued) 
 
Panel C: Partner firms for non-diversifying joint ventures 
Interval Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample 
 
 Mean% Median% z-statistic Generalized sign test 
-5 to –1 
 
0.50 -0.91 -0.95 42 
-2 to +2 
 
3.52 1.28       4.04***       65*** 
-1 to 0 
 
2.44 0.64       4.33***       64*** 
+1 to+ 5 
 
         -0.48 0.18 -0.04 52 
  
    The abnormal return for the event window (-5, -1) is insignificant suggesting that there 
is little anticipation of the announcements. The analysis of the abnormal return for the event 
window (+1, +5) indicates that the market fails to fully capitalize the information contained with 
the joint venture announcement at the time of the announcement. However, further analysis for 
the two sub-samples indicates that this effect is confined to diversifying joint ventures. This 
result provides partial evidence on the puzzle of the negative market reaction following the 
announcement of alliances6. 
3.3.3 Determinants of a diversifying versus non-diversifying strategic alliance formation 
Table IV presents the analysis of the main determinants of a firm’s decision to form a 
non-diversifying or a diversifying joint venture. Furthermore, given the choice of a non-
diversifying joint venture the analysis presents the main determinants of the firm’s choice of the 
activity of the joint venture as one of the existing activities, i.e. the degree of overlap between the 
joint ventures activity and the activities of the existing business segments. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Socher (2004) notes that the negative market reaction following strategic alliances formation is yet to be explained: 
”Whereas this phenomenon is seen in several event studies, a rational explanation is not found yet.” 
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Table IV 
The dependent variable in the selection model is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for non-diversifying joint 
ventures and 0 otherwise. On the second and third column, the dependent variable is the degree of overlap of the 
joint venture with one of the existing segments of the partner firm. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated as 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index = , where ∑
=
N
i
i
1
2α iα  represents the market share of firm i within an industry with N 
firms. GDP is the real growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. Technology dummy takes value 1 if the contract 
specifies either one or a combination of R&D, technology or product development and 0 otherwise. Ownership is an 
indicator that takes value 1 if the firm has more than fifty percent of the ownership in the joint venture LnAge is the 
natural logarithm of the number of months between the first listing of the partner firm on CRSP and the date of the 
announcement.. Cash flow from operations is cash flow generated from all operating activities and is measured as a 
ratio relative to the total assets of the firm. Operating income is sales minus cost of goods sold and other expenses, 
before depreciation and amortization, and is measures as a ratio to total assets of the firm.  The growth dummy is an 
indicator variable, which is one if the firm is high-growth, and 0 otherwise. Relative efficiency ratio is defined as 
cash flow at segment level divided by total sales of the segment minus the industry median divided by industry 
median and is calculated for the segment that has the same SIC code with the that of the joint venture. Number of 
segments represents the number of segments of the partner firm. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Regressions 
 
Predicted sign 
 
Selection model (1) 
 
Substantial analysis (1) 
 
Substantial analysis (2) 
 
Constant     0.1043 
(0.74) 
 
   1.7471 
(0.00) 
   1.7550 
(0.00) 
Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index 
-       -0.6255** 
(0.03) 
 
  
GDP -       -8.9900** 
(0.03) 
 
  
Technology 
dummy 
+        0.2789** 
(0.03) 
 
  
Ownership 
indicator 
-     -0.3463* 
(0.07) 
 
  
LnAge -    -0.0348 
(0.43) 
 
        -0.1002*** 
(0.00) 
        -0.0978*** 
(0.00) 
Operating Income -    -0.0001 
(0.71) 
 
 
Cash flow form 
operations 
-     -0.0555 
(0.73) 
 
Growth dummy +          0.1302** 
(0.04) 
 
       0.1310** 
(0.04) 
Relative efficiency 
ratio 
+/-      0.0475 
(0.37) 
 
   0.0484 
(0.36) 
Number of 
segments 
-    -0.0003 
(0.22) 
  -0.0003 
(0.22) 
LAMBDA          0.513***        0.527*** 
Total effect of age        -0.007***  -0.013* 
Model p-value        0.00***       0.00***       0.00*** 
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The dependent variable for the probit model (selection model) is a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 for partner firms forming non-diversifying joint ventures and 0 otherwise. The 
dependent variable at the second stage (the OLS analysis) is the degree of overlap between joint 
venture activity (four digits SIC code) and the activity of existing business segments. The degree 
of overlap is defined as the ratio of the sale of the focal business segment (the segment with the 
same SIC code as the primary SIC of the joint venture) and the total sales at the firm level. 
The results at the selection model level indicate that non-diversifying joint ventures are 
less likely to be formed by firm in highly concentrated industries, and during economic 
downturns. The analysis indicates that partnering firms are more likely to form technological 
non-diversifying joint ventures, and that they are willing to accept a minority ownership in the 
newly created entity. Consistent with predictions formulated by hypothesis 2a, the coefficient of 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is negative and significant at 5% level. Therefore, firms in highly 
competitive industries are willing to form non-diversifying joint ventures in order to preserve 
their market share. The coefficient of GDP is negative and significant, indicating that asset 
redeployment outside the firm’s boundaries through non-diversifying joint venture formations is 
less likely during economic expansion. This result is consistent with the implications formulated 
by Maksimovic and Phillips (1999) for asset sales. Following their argument, my finding that 
non-diversifying joint ventures are less likely during economic upturns is consistent with the fact 
that firms are less likely to deploy capacity outside firm’s boundaries when growth resumes. The 
results also indicate that technological joint ventures are more likely to be formed as a non-
diversifying strategy in order to minimize the moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
Finally, the coefficient of ownership variable is negative and significant at 10% level, a result 
consistent with the main prediction formulated by hypothesis H2d. 
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The difference between the two substantial analyses consists of using two different 
variables that capture firms’ operating performance before the joint venture formation. The 
analysis of the marginal effect of age on the degree of overlap shows that younger firms are more 
likely to form joint ventures with a high degree of overlap with the existing activities. This result 
is consistent with the argument that younger firms in search for market recognition form joint 
ventures in the same line of expertise as their core activities. The coefficient of the growth 
dummy has the predicted sign and is significant in both substantial analyses. Consistent with 
hypothesis H2f, this result indicates that firms entering non-diversifying joint ventures are more 
likely to have investment opportunities that can be profitably integrated with the joint venture. I 
do not find evidence that firms with a higher performance enter a joint venture with a higher 
degree of overlap with the existing activities7. The coefficients of Operating income and Cash 
Flow from Operations are statistically insignificants. Also, the coefficient of the relative 
efficiency of the focal segment has the predicted sign but is insignificant at the conventional 
levels. This result indicates that, on average, the segments whose activities are duplicated by the 
activity of the joint venture are managed equally efficient, regardless of the degree of overlap. 
The coefficient of Lambda is statistically different from zero, indicating that that there are 
unmeasured characteristics, which make firms choose to enter a non-diversifying joint venture, 
correlated with the degree of overlap between joint venture activity and existing activities 
undertaken by the partner firm.  
3.3.4 Changes in excess value around joint venture formation 
The sample used to test hypotheses H3 and H4 is constructed using a multiple-stage 
process. I start with the sub-sample of 308 partner firms forming a joint venture during the 
                                                 
7 Mohanram and Nanda (1998) finds that partnering firms forming joint ventures underperform their industry 
counterparts 
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period of 1991 and 1997.  First, I exclude firms that do not have financial data available on 
Compustat, both at the firm and segment level, one year after the joint venture formation. I also 
exclude any firm that has at least one financial segment or one of its business segments is not 
assigned an SIC. Second, following the convention in the literature, I exclude any firms where 
the sum of divisional assets deviates by more than 25% of the firm total assets8. This sample 
cleaning process results in 184 firms that form a joint venture. The restriction of the sample for 
the period during 1991 and 1997 is motivated by the change in accounting standards in reporting 
data at the segment level. Information at the segment level follows the regulations of the 
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC). 
In 1997 the Securities and Exchange Committee adopted the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards 131 (SFAS 131) that replaced SFAS 14. Under the SFAS 14, a company was required 
to report a segment if more than 10 % of assets, sales or profit could be attributed to an industry 
sector. According to SFAS 14, an industry segment was “a component of an enterprise engaged 
in providing a product or service or a group of related products and services primarily to 
unaffiliated customers…for profit”. Recognizing that the information released according to 
SFAS 14 was ineffective, as many diversified firms reported themselves as single segment firms, 
the FASB replaced the industry segment-reporting standard with the one on the basis of 
“operating segments”. Under the new accounting standard, SFAS 13, a company is required to 
report financial information on the basis of “operating segments” for which separate financial 
information is available, the management regularly evaluates how to allocate resources, and 
assesses performance. More precisely, an operating segment is defined as a component of a 
business that engages in activities from which it may earn revenues and incur expenses, whose 
operating results are regularly reviewed by the enterprise’s “chief operating decision maker” to 
                                                 
8 This restriction was imposed by Berger and Ofek (1995) when deriving the excess value measures 
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make decisions about resources to be allocated to the segment and assess its performance. 
Finally, an operating segment is a component of the business for which discrete financial 
information is available. Table V presents the annual distribution of the sub-sample of firms 
forming joint ventures between 1991 and 1996. The distribution is relatively uniform for the first 
four years and slightly higher for the years of 1995 and 1996.  
 
Table V 
The sample consists on 184 firms that initiated joint ventures between 1991 and 1996 with sufficient data to 
calculate excess value as defined in Berger and Ofek (1995).  
Panel A: Partner firms by year 
 All sample 
 
Single segment firms 
 
Multiple segment firms 
 
Year N % N % N % 
1991 29 
 
15.76 15 13.89 14 18.42 
1992 25 
 
13.59 17 15.74 8 10.53 
1993 28 
 
15.22 10 9.26 18 23.68 
1994 22 
 
11.96 17 15.74 5 6.58 
1995 38 
 
20.65 21 19.44 17 22.37 
1996 42 
 
22.83 28 25.93 14 18.42 
Total 184 100 108 100 76 100 
 
Panel B: Partner firms by year 
 All sample 
 
Diversifying JV 
 
Non-diversifying JV 
 
Year N % N % N % 
1991 29 
 
15.76 12 24.00 17 12.69 
1992 25 
 
13.59 9 18.00 16 11.94 
1993 28 
 
15.22 7 14.00 21 15.67 
1994 22 
 
11.96 6 12.00 16 11.94 
1995 38 
 
20.65 7 14.00 31 23.13 
1996 42 
 
22.83 9 18.00 33 24.63 
Total 184 100 50 100 134 100 
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(table V continued) 
 
Panel C: Partner firms by industry 
 All sample 
 
Industry (2 digit SIC codes) N % 
Agriculture, Mining, Constructions (01-17) 
 
23 12.50 
Manufacturing (20-39) 
 
97 52.72 
Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Service (40-49) 
 
19 10.33 
Wholesale and Retail Trade (50-59) 
 
12 6.52 
General Services and Others (70-99) 
 
33 17.93 
Total 184 100 
 
Panel A distinguishes between single segment and multiple segments firms, while Panel 
B distinguishes between firms entering diversifying and non-diversifying joint ventures. Panel C 
indicates that the distribution of firms across industries follows the same pattern as for the whole 
sample, with a high representation of firms from manufacturing industries and a low 
representation of Wholesale and Retail Trade industries. 
Table VI presents the mean and median excess value based on asset and sales multiplier 
of the partner firms in the year before and the year after joint venture formation. The mean 
excess value before joint venture formation is a statistically significant 0.037 based on asset 
multiplier and 0.053 based on sales multiplier. Therefore, the partner firms in my sample are 
valued at 8.89% above the imputed value based on asset multiplier, and 11.29% above the 
imputed value based on sales multiplier. In the year following the joint venture formation, the 
average excess value is a statistically insignificant –0.010 based on asset multiplier and –0.021 
for sales multiplier. Consistent with the view that joint ventures formation diversifies the capital 
need of the partner firms, the decrease in excess value from before to after the joint venture 
formation is statistically significant at 1% level. 
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Table VI 
This table reports excess value based on asset multiplier for the year prior to and the year following the joint 
ventures formation. The sample consists of 184 firms that initiated a joint venture between 1991 and 1996 with 
sufficient data to calculate excess value as defined in Berger and Ofek (1995). Panel A reports results for the full 
sample. Panel B and C examine sub-samples. Median values are reported in parentheses below mean value. The last 
row of every panel reports the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference in means. . *, **, and *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: All Partner firms 
 Excess value based on 
asset multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value based 
on sale multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value before    0.037** 
(0.021) 
 
184    0.052** 
(0.034) 
183 
Excess value after              -0.010 
(0.000) 
 
184  -0.021 
(- 0.021) 
182 
Difference    0.000***     0.000***  
 
Panel B: Single segment firms 
 Excess value based on 
asset multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value based 
on sale multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value before       0.066*** 
(0.029) 
 
108       0.121*** 
(0.072) 
107 
Excess value after  0.000 
(-0.001) 
 
108  0.014 
(-0.019) 
106 
Difference       0.000***        0.000***  
   
Panel C: Multiple segment firms 
 Excess value based on 
asset multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value based 
on sale multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value before 0.002 
(0.005) 
 
76             -0.044 
(0.010) 
76 
Excess value after              -0.025 
(0.002) 
 
76      -0.071*** 
(-0.045) 
76 
Difference               0.263     0.456  
 
Panel D: Partner firms forming a non-diversifying joint venture 
 Excess value based on 
asset multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value based 
on sale multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value before    0.084** 
(0.040) 
 
50  0.070* 
(0.049) 
49 
Excess value after             - 0.011 
             (0.002) 
 
50  0.009 
(-0.020) 
49 
Difference      0.000***       0.000**  
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(table VI continued) 
 
Panel E: Partner firms forming a diversifying joint venture 
 Excess value based on 
asset multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value based 
on sale multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value before 0.020 
(0.010) 
 
135 0.045 
(0.028) 
134 
Excess value after -0.009 
(-0.001) 
 
135 - 0.033 
(-0.024) 
133 
Difference 0.169       0.001***  
 
I also separate the joint venture partners into two groups based on number of segments. 
The analysis indicates that the results of a premium before the joint venture formation is 
confined to the sub-sample of single segment firms While single segment firms are valued at a 
premium one year before the joint venture formation, the excess value for multiple segment 
firms is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, the change in excess value 
documented for the whole sample seems to be confined to the sub-sample of single segment 
firms. In the year after the joint venture formation, firms in both sub-samples have a statistically 
insignificant excess value. Similar results are obtained when using sale multiplier for the sub-
sample of single segment firms.  
My results are in the same line of arguments with the evidence presented by Berger and 
Ofek (1995).  Their results indicate that the excess value of the multiple segment firms is lower 
that the excess value for single segment firms. For my sample, this relation still holds, but the 
magnitude of the excess value that I document for the sample of partnering firms entering a joint 
venture is higher. However, the analysis performed for the two sub-sample emphasize that joint 
venture creation is a corporate strategy that results in value destruction and the effect is confined 
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to the sample of single segment firms. This finding is consistent with the argument that single 
segment firms lack the benefit of having internal capital markets and the need of financing new 
investments diverts resources from their core competencies.  
I also separate the joint venture partners into partner firms forming a joint venture as a 
non-diversifying strategy and partner firms entering a diversifying strategy. Panel D shows the 
excess value based on asset and sales multiplier for the sub-sample of non-diversifying joint 
ventures. For this sub-sample, the excess value based on asset multiplier is 0.084 and is 
statistically significant at 5% level. One year after the joint venture formation, partnering firms 
entering non-diversifying joint ventures are valued at no premium. The decrease in excess value 
is statistically significant. This result may be driven by the market perception that the duplication 
of one of the activities undertaken by a firm is a risky strategy, as there is a higher probability 
that the partnering firm looses proprietary assets through a joint venture formation. 
  Firms entering diversifying joint ventures are valued at no discount one year before, as 
well as one year after the joint venture formation.   The average impact of a diversifying joint 
venture formation on the relative valuation of the partnering firm to the industry counterparts is 
insignificant. This result is consistent with the view that diversifying joint ventures offer the 
benefits of exploiting economies of scale and scope, while avoiding the cost associated with 
diversification through an acquisition or a merger.  
I further divide the sub-sample of single segment firms entering a joint venture into firms 
entering non-diversifying joint ventures and firms entering diversifying joint ventures. The 
results of the analysis presented in both panels of Table VII reinforce the argument that market 
perceives a non-diversifying joint venture as a risky strategy in terms of the partner firm’s ability 
to protect proprietary assets. In the year prior to the joint venture formation, single segment firms 
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forming a non-diversifying joint venture are valued at an impressive 13.01% premium. In the 
year following the joint venture formation, partnering firms are valued at the industry median. 
 
 
 
Table VII 
This table reports excess value based on asset multiplier for the year prior to and the year following the joint 
ventures formation. The sample consists of 29 single segment firms that initiated a non-diversifying or a diversifying 
joint venture between 1991 and 1996 with sufficient data to calculate excess value as defined in Berger and Ofek 
(1995). Panel A reports results for the full sample. Panel B and C examine sub-samples. The last row of every panel 
reports the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference in means. . *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Single segment firms entering a non-diversifying joint venture 
 Excess value based on 
asset multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value based 
on sale multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value before     0.115** 
(0.049) 
 
29     0.135** 
(0.072) 
29 
Excess value after -0.001 
(0.004) 
 
29   0.079 
(- 0.012) 
28 
Difference    0.017**     0.048**  
 
Panel B: Single segment firms entering a diversifying joint venture 
 Excess value based on 
asset multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value based 
on sale multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value before 0.047 
(0.020) 
 
79       0.116*** 
(0.071) 
78 
Excess value after 0.001 
(-0.002) 
 
79 -0.008 
(- 0.019) 
78 
Difference    0.121     0.000***  
 
In summary, the change in excess value around joint venture formation indicates that, on 
average, these hybrid corporate strategies are value destroying. However the analysis reveals that 
the effect is mostly confined to single segment firms, in particular single segment firms entering 
a non-diversifying joint venture. The valuation of the multiple segment firms relative to their 
industry counterparts is not affected by joint venture formations. 
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3.3.5. Joint ventures formation: impact on the efficiency of internal capital markets 
The analysis of the impact of joint ventures formation on the efficiency of internal capital 
markets requires a further restriction in the sample by eliminating single segment firms. From the 
sample of 76 multiple segment firms used for the previous analysis, I exclude 3 firms without 
sufficient data at the segment level to calculate at least one of the three proxies of the efficiency 
of capital allocation.  
Several studies document a positive relationship between change in investment efficiency 
and change in excess value around asset sales and spin-offs (Ahn and Denis, 2003; Dittmar and 
Shivdasany, 2003; Burch and Nanda, 2003).  
 
Table VIII 
This table reports the different measure of the allocation efficiency of the internal capital markets for the year prior 
to and the year following the joint ventures formation. The sample consists of 76 multi-segment firms that initiated a 
joint venture between 1991 and 1996 with sufficient data to calculate the relative value added by allocation (RVA) 
as defined in Rajan and Zingales (2000), q sensitivity of investment as defined in Peyer and Shivdasani (2001), and 
cash flow sensitivity as defined in Peyer (2002). Median values are reported in parentheses below mean values. The 
last row of every panel reports the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference in means. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Relative value added by allocation (RVA) 
 Mean 
Median 
Number of 
observations 
 RVA before 
 
0.001 
(0.000) 
 
73 
 RVA after 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
73 
p-value 0.804  
 
Panel B: q sensitivity of investment 
 Mean 
Median 
Number of 
observations 
q sensitivity of investment before 
 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
 
73 
q sensitivity of investment after 
 
0.012 
(0.000) 
 
72 
p-value 0.613  
   
 
 52
(table VIII continued) 
 
Panel C: Cash-flow sensitivity of investment 
 Mean 
Median 
Number of 
observations 
Cash flow sensitivity of investment before 
 
  0.005* 
(0.000) 
 
73 
Cash flow sensitivity of investment after 
 
0.090 
(0.004) 
 
72 
p-value       0.002***  
 
The results of the analysis presented in Table VIII are consistent with these studies. In the 
year prior to joint venture formation, relative value added by allocation, as developed by Rajan, 
Servaes, and Zingales (2000) is 0.001, insignificantly different than zero. Multiple segment 
partner firms allocate as much capital to segments with above average investment opportunities 
as to segment with investment opportunities with below average investment opportunities; hence 
the firm have the same investment pattern as single segment industry counterparts in those 
segments. There is no significant change in the year following the joint venture formation, as the 
difference in means is insignificantly different than zero. This result is reinforced by the analysis 
using the q sensitivity of investment as developed by Peyer and Shivdasani (2001). Somehow 
different result is provided by the analysis of cash flow sensitivity of investment, a proxy 
developed by Peyer (2002). The result indicates that the decrease in investment efficiency is 
significant around joint ventures formation. However, cash flow sensitivity of investment is only 
marginally significant one year before the joint venture formation, while insignificant one year 
after. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This study provides a re-examination of the market reaction at the announcements of 
joint ventures formation. Consistent with the evidence found in prior studies, I document that on 
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average, investors perceive these corporate strategies to be value creating. I further show that 
joint ventures enhancing value upon announcement can be distinguished from those that do not 
create value. I divide joint ventures into diversifying and non-diversifying based on the degree of 
overlap of their activity with concurrent activities undertaken by the partner firms. The analysis 
reveals that non-diversifying joint ventures are value enhancing, while non-diversifying joint 
ventures do not destroy value. I also provide evidence that, while there is little anticipation at the 
announcements of joint ventures, market fails to fully capitalize the information embedded in the 
announcements for the sub-sample of diversifying joint ventures. 
I find that non-diversifying joint ventures are less likely to be formed by partner firms 
situated in highly concentrated industries, during periods of economic expansion. I also suggest 
that technological joint ventures are more likely to be formed as non-diversifying strategies and 
that partner firms entering this type of strategy are more willing to accept a minority shareholder 
stake in the newly formed entity. Furthermore, the degree of overlap between joint venture 
activity and concurrent activities undertaken by the partner firms is negatively related to firm’s 
age and positively related to its growth opportunities.  
I also find that joint ventures formation negatively impact the valuation of partner firms 
relative to their industry counterparts. I show that, on average, partnering firms are traded at a 
premium before the joint venture formation. At the end of the year following the joint venture 
formation the excess value measure is insignificantly different than zero. However, this result 
seems to be mostly confined to the sub-sample of single segment firms, specifically to single 
segment firms initiating a non-diversifying strategy. For the sub-sample of multiple segment 
firms I find no evidence that joint ventures formation significantly impacts the valuation of the 
firm or the efficiency of internal capital markets. 
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4. Essay 2: 
Value Creation through Diversifying versus Non-diversifying Strategic 
Alliance Formations 
 
In this essay I test three main hypotheses related to the impact of strategic alliance 
formations on partner firms’ valuation. First, I analyze the market reaction at the announcements 
of strategic alliances. Second, I analyze internal and external determinants of a strategic alliance 
formation as either diversifying or non-diversifying strategy. Third, I examine the impact of 
strategic alliance formations on firms’ valuation during the year following the initiation of the 
alliance.  
4.1. Hypotheses 
4.1.1. Market reaction at the announcements of strategic alliance formations 
Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) document positive market reaction at the 
announcement of strategic alliances formed by US firms. Their sample is spanning 1983-1992 
and includes 345 strategic alliances. The magnitude of the abnormal returns is a significant 
0.64%, and no evidence of wealth transfer between the partners in the alliance was found. Their 
results document that the abnormal market reaction is mainly confined to a sub-sample of high-
tech firms. Further analysis indicates that firms entering horizontal alliances involving transfer or 
pooling of technology experienced the highest market reaction (3.54%). They distinguish 
between horizontal and vertical alliances based on the difference between the three-digit SIC 
code of the partner firms. Non-horizontal alliances with a main objective of entering new 
markets experienced a positive abnormal return with a magnitude of 1.45%, while horizontal 
non-technical and non-horizontal technical alliances were met with no significant market 
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reaction. Finally, Chan et al. (1997) find that firms that form strategic alliances have superior 
operating performance relative to their industry counterparts over the five-year period 
surrounding the alliance formation year.  
Das, Sen and Sengupta (1998) investigate the stock price response to the formation of 
119 strategic alliances during the period of 1987 and 1991. They classify strategic alliances into 
technological and marketing alliances. Technological alliances incorporate research and 
development, technology transfer, and manufacturing, while marketing alliances include 
distribution, marketing, and customer service. The abnormal returns documented for the whole 
sample are positive and statistically significant. However, the results were mainly driven by the 
sub-sample of technological alliances, while marketing alliances had insignificant abnormal 
returns.  
Kale, Dyer, and Singh (2002) provide further insight on the market reaction to the 
strategic alliance formations by incorporating in the analysis firms’ experience in managing 
strategic alliances. As hypothesized, firms with greater alliance experience experienced higher 
cumulative abnormal returns than firms without an alliance function. Finally, Kale et al (2002) 
shows that market reaction is positively related to benefits provided by the alliance, measured by 
managerial assessments and accounting data. 
In this study, I distinguish between diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliances 
based on the degree of overlap between the activity of the alliance (four-digits SIC code) and the 
activities developed by the each partner firm. When there is no such an overlap I classify the 
alliance formation as a diversifying strategy. Therefore, a strategic alliance formation may be a 
diversifying strategy for one of the partner firms and a non-diversifying for the other, 
diversifying strategy for both partner firms or non-diversifying for both partner firms. I also 
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classify all alliances that have research and development, technology, and manufacturing as 
technology alliances and others such as marketing, supply, and licensing agreements, as non-
technology alliances. Based on this classifications and previous empirical evidence, I 
hypothesize that: 
H1: Strategic alliances formations are met with positive market reaction around the date 
of the announcement. Non-diversifying alliances experience a higher market abnormal 
return than diversifying alliances.  
4.1.2. Firms’ choice of entering diversifying or non-diversifying strategic alliances 
Firm’s decision to enter a specific strategic alliance is not a random process. Koza and 
Lewin (1996) argue that firm’s choice to enter into an alliance can be distinguished in terms of 
its motivation to exploit an existing capability or to explore for new opportunities.  Next section 
derives the hypotheses explaining a firm’s choice of entering a strategic alliance as a diversifying 
or a non-diversifying strategy. 
i) Strategic position: Baum and Oliver (1991) argue that strategic alliances formed by 
firms in highly competitive industries are providing the partner firms with valuable resources 
needed to ride out difficult times. Strategic alliances constitute useful arrangement with a 
purpose of sharing costs, and thus a useful vehicle to ease profit pressure, which are particularly 
intense in highly competitive industries. However, these benefits are more likely to be higher 
when strategic alliance is designed as a non-diversifying strategy. Such alliances also help the 
partnering firms to distinguish themselves from other competitors. Based on the aforementioned 
arguments, I conjecture that: 
H2a: Firms in highly competitive industries are more likely to form non-diversifying 
strategic alliances. 
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ii) Economic conditions: Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) stipulate that: “ strategic 
alliance formation is a complex phenomenon involving both strategic and social factors 
operating within a logic of needs and opportunities for cooperation”. One of these factors may 
also be related to the economic growth/decline at the time of strategic alliance formation. During 
economic expansion periods, a firm’s ability to quickly increase its productive capacity brings 
the advantage of the first mover, which results in gaining a higher market share. Non-
diversifying strategic alliances prove to be a rapid and flexible way of making the necessary 
adjustment to resources. Firms are also faced with the decision to expand into other markets, as 
periods of economic booms are characterized by new investment opportunities. Diversifying 
strategic alliances allows partnering firms to undertake these opportunities, without incurring the 
effects of instant integration involved in asset purchases or mergers. Therefore, I argue that: 
H2b:  Firm’s decision of entering a diversifying or a non-diversifying strategic alliance 
during economic upwards is equally motivated. 
iii) Technological alliances: According to Hagedoorn (1993), technological strategic 
alliances involve cooperation in upstream value chain activities such as R&D, manufacturing and 
engineering, whereas non-technological strategic alliances involve cooperation in downstream 
value chains as sales and distribution. Similar to technological joint ventures, technological 
strategic alliances are subject to severe moral hazard and adverse selection problems because of 
the difficulty in assessing the true value of the output. Non-diversifying strategic alliances 
partially mitigate these problems, as partner firm has previous experience in that particular line 
of business. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H2c: Technological strategic alliances are more likely to be formed as non-diversifying 
strategies. 
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iv) Firm’s age: Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999) investigate the extent to which 
interorganizational networks of young companies affect their ability to acquire the resources 
necessary for survival and growth. Young firms with high growth opportunities and higher 
operating performance, whose quality is good but not easily observable, may enter an alliance to 
enhance its visibility to would-be buyers or suppliers. Along the same lines, Allen and Phillips 
(2000) and Pablo and Subramaniam (2001) point out that an alliance provides a way to finance 
growth opportunities without facing the cost of external finance. Strong relationships with 
prominent firms, not necessarily operating in the same industry, convey the positive evaluation 
received by young companies from influential organizations. Therefore, a strategic alliance 
formation acts as an endorsement of the quality of existing activities developed by the young 
partner firm. Firms with strong strategic position within their industries, usually mature firms, 
are less likely to form strategic alliances overlapping their existing activities. Their decision to 
form a strategic alliance is more likely to be undertaken as a first step of entering new markets 
searching for new growth opportunities. Based on these arguments, I hypothesize that:  
H2d: Younger firm with high growth opportunities are more likely to form a non-
diversifying strategic alliances, while mature firms with lower growth opportunities are 
more likely to form diversifying strategic alliances. 
v) Relative efficiency of the focal segment: Another motive driving the firms’ choice of a 
non-diversifying alliance formation may be linked to the investment efficiency of the segment 
having the same primary SIC code with that of the strategic alliance. If the management wants to 
focus the available resources into core activities, and therefore are less willing to invest in 
peripheral activities, an alliance involving the peripheral divisions may prove to be helpful 
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because partnering firm may provides valuable expertise and possibly necessary resources. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H2e:  A firm is more likely to form a non-diversifying strategic alliance with a lower 
degree of overlap when the investment ratio of the focal segment is low. 
vi) Change in Excess Value around Strategic Alliance Formation:  The strategic behavior theory 
of Kogut (1988) and Jarillo (1989) suggests that firms enter strategic alliances because of long-
term strategic consideration, regardless of immediate cost-benefit consideration. Therefore, a 
strategic alliance that is valuable in the long run need not have a short-term net benefit9. Khanna 
(1998) identifies sources of benefit that accrue to partnering firms entering a strategic alliance. 
He defines private benefits, as those that accrue to subsets of participants in an alliance while 
common benefits are defined as those that accrue collectively to all participants. Private benefits 
are more likely to be appropriated by the leading firm, the partnering firm with the highest 
investment made in the alliance. He further argues that the degree of overlap between the 
alliance scope and the scope of the firm determines the amount of resources invested in the 
alliance.  Therefore, firms entering non-diversifying strategic alliances are more likely to further 
increase their investment immediately after the alliance formation. However, the necessary 
resources are part of the broader range of resources available to other existing activities 
developed by firm but not governed by the alliance. Hence, partnering firms trying to derive 
higher private benefits from the alliance may need to fall back on their internal capital markets to 
finance sequential investments immediately after the alliance formation.  However, an efficient 
internal capital market may be used to transfer resources from segments with low growth 
                                                 
9 Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) find that firms that enter a strategic alliance tend to outperform their 
industry counterparts when performance measures are considered over an interval of five years around the alliance 
formation, but perform similarly when performance is measured from the year before to the year after the alliance 
formation. 
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opportunities to a better use offered by the strategic alliance. Single segment firms are more 
likely to be negatively affected, as they lack the flexibility provided by internal capital markets. 
Market participants may penalize a single segment firm’s decision to redistribute the limited 
resources between the only activity developed in the house and strategic alliance. Thus, 
hypothesis 5 is stated as follows: 
H3: There is a negative impact of a strategic alliance on the valuation of the partner firm 
relative to its industry counterparts. This effect is more likely to be confined to the sub-
sample of single segment firms. 
4.2. Variables Definitions and Methodology 
In this section, I define the variables and describe the methodology used to test the 
hypotheses. 
4.2.1. Market reaction at the announcements of strategic alliances 
I examine the wealth effects of strategic alliances formation by employing the event-
study methodology used by Dodd and Warner (1983).  I estimate a market model over 155-day 
period ending 45 days before the announcement of the alliance. I perform the analysis for the 
whole sample and for the sub-samples of diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliances. I 
classify a strategic alliance as a diversifying corporate strategy when none of partner’s business 
segments share the same four digits SIC code with the primary SIC of the strategic alliance. 
Similarly, a non-diversifying strategic alliance implies that at least one of the business segments 
of the partner firm share the same SIC code with that of the strategic alliance. Figure 1 illustrates 
one example of strategic alliance formation as a diversifying strategy for one of the partners and 
non-diversifying for the other partner. On January 1st, 1992 Parametric Technology Corp and the 
Flight system division of United Technology Corp signed an agreement to jointly develop 
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Parametric’s Pro/ Composite CAE application for automated design and manufacture of 
composite parts. There is a perfect overlap between the SIC code of the strategic alliance and the 
SIC code of the Mechanical design software business segment of the Parametric Technology 
Corp. None of the United Technology Corp business segments share the same SIC code with the 
strategic alliance. Therefore, I classify this strategic alliance as a diversifying strategy for United 
Technology Corp and as a non-diversifying strategy for Parametric Technology Corp. 
 
Figure 1 
Strategic alliance as a Diversifying versus Non-diversifying Strategy 
 Parent firm 1        Parent firm 2 
UNITED TECHNOLOGY CORP     PARAMETRIC TECHNOLOGY CORP 
     (SIC code 3724)       (SIC code 7372) 
 
            Strategic Alliance 
            (SIC code 7372) 
 
UNITED TECHNOLOGY CORP Strategic Alliance  
 
PARAMETRIC TECHNOLOGY CORP 
Business segments 
 
SIC code SIC code Business segments SIC code 
Power 3724 
 
7372 Mechanical design Software 7372 
Automotive 
 
3714    
Flight system 
 
3721    
Building systems 
 
3534    
Other  
 
3674    
 
4.2.2. Firm’s choice of entering a strategic alliance as diversifying or non-diversifying 
strategy 
In order to test hypotheses H2a through H2e, I use the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
selection model10. The main variables used in the analysis are as follows: a) Herfindahl-
                                                 
10 A detailed description of Heckman two-stage model is presented in Section 3.2.2. of this dissertation 
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Hirschman Index measured as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index= , where  represents the 
market share of firm i within an industry with N firms; b) Technology dummy that takes value 1 
if the contract specifies either one or a combination of R&D, technology or product 
development; c) GDP is the real growth on the Gross Domestic Product; d) Size defined as the 
natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm; e) Segment investment ratio is defined as the 
ratio of capital expenditures to total sales of the focal segment, i.e business segment sharing the 
same primary SIC code with the strategic alliance ; f) a growth indicator dummy set to 1 when 
market-to-book market to book ratio of the firm is higher than 1 and 0 otherwise; g) Cash flow 
from operations is cash flow generated from all operating activities and is measured as a ratio 
relative to the total assets of the firm; h) Operating return on assets is operating income before 
depreciation divided by total assets. Following Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), I use the 
ratio of the firms’ market value of assets to book value of assets as a proxy for growth options in 
the firm’s investment opportunity set. Market value equals the book value of assets minus the 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity. 
∑
=
α
N
1i
2
i iα
4.2.3. Measure of relative valuation 
In measuring the relative valuation of the partner firms I use the excess value metrics, as 
initially developed by Berger and Ofek (1995), which compares a firm’s value to its imputed 
value of each of its segments operated as a single segment firms. For each firm, segments are 
valued using median industry asset and sales multipliers of single segment firms. The imputed 
value of the firm is the sum of the segment values. Excess value is calculated as the logarithm of 
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the ratio of firm value to imputed value11. Positive excess value indicates that the firm trades at a 
premium, while negative values are indicative of a premium.  
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Data and summary statistics 
Using a sample spanning 1991-2000, I examine the market reaction at the announcements 
of strategic alliances formation, the main determinants of a firm’s choice to form strategic 
alliances as a diversifying and non-diversifying strategy and whether strategic alliances 
formation favorably affects the valuation of the partner firms relative to their industry 
counterparts. The list of strategic alliances comes from Thompson Financial Security database 
(SDC- Joint Ventures/Alliances). In order to test H1 through H2e, I select only strategic alliances 
formed by two publicly traded US firms with available financial data on Compustat both at the 
firm and business segment level for the year prior to strategic alliance formation. I start with an 
initial sample of 3106 strategic alliances formed by two publicly traded industrial partner firms. I 
select only those strategic alliances where both partnering firms have financial data on the 
Compustat Industry Segment file one year before the alliance formation. This leaves a total of 
1637 strategic alliances initiated by 3274 partner firms between 1991 and 2000. 
Table I presents the annual distribution of the strategic alliances. The minimum number 
of strategic alliances formations in the sample is 29 during the year of 1991, involving 58 firms, 
and the maximum number is 292 during the year of 1997, involving 584 firms. Within the same 
year there is a similar percentage of non-diversifying and diversifying strategic alliances out of 
the total for each sub-sample.  
 
                                                 
11 For a detailed description of the excess value measure see Section 3.2.3 
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Table I 
The industry refers to the industry of the alliance, i.e. the primary SIC code of the alliance. The sample consists on 
2489 firms that initiate diversifying strategic alliances and 785 firms that initiate non-diversifying strategic alliances 
between 01/01/91 and 12/31/00. All deals are identified using the Security Data Corporation (SDC) Joint Ventures 
and Alliances database. 
Panel A: Number of parent firms by year 
 Non-Diversifying SA 
 
Diversifying SA 
 
Year  Number % Number % 
1991 
 
9 0.01 49 0.02 
1992 
 
77 9.81 299 12.01 
1993 
 
72 9.17 290 11.65 
1994 
 
95 12.10 289 11.61 
1995 
 
106 13.50 314 12.62 
1996 
 
102 12.99 254 10.20 
1997 
 
160 20.38 424 17.03 
1998 
 
70 8.92 208 8.36 
1999 
 
64 8.15 250 10.04 
2000 
 
30 3.82 112 4.50 
Total number of firms 785 100 2489 100 
 
Panel B: Parent firms by industry 
  Non-Diversifying SA 
 
Diversifying SA 
 
SIC Sector Number %  Number %  
0 
 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 0 0 5 0.20 
1 
 
Mining and Construction 5 0.64 15 0.60 
2 
 
Manufacturing 110 14.01 437 17.56 
3 
 
Manufacturing 199 25.35 1074 43.15 
4 
 
Transportation and Communication 34 4.33 138 5.54 
5 
 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 26 3.31 118 4.74 
7 
 
Lodging and Entertainment 405 51.59 666 26.76 
8 
 
Services 5 0.64 32 1.29 
9 
 
Public Administration 1 0.13 4 0.16 
 All sectors 785 100 2489 100 
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(table I continued) 
 
Panel C: Alliances by industry 
  Non-Diversifying SA 
 
Diversifying SA 
 
SIC Sector Number %  Number %  
0 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 
 
0 0 6 0.24 
1 
 
Mining and Construction 6 0.76 12 0.48 
2 
 
Manufacturing 106 13.5 272         10.93 
3 
 
Manufacturing 199 25.35 639         25.67 
4 
 
Transportation and Communication 32 4.08 96           3.86 
5 
 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 31 3.95 495         19.85 
7 
 
Lodging and Entertainment 406 51.72 786         31.62 
8 
 
Services 5 0.64 149           5.99 
9 
 
Public Administration 0 0 34 1.37 
 All sectors 785 100 2489 100 
 
Panel B shows the industry distribution of the partner firms. There is a high 
representation of manufacturing and lodging and entertainment firms, accounting for almost 72% 
of the total sample. Similar distribution is shown in Panel C, where the difference between 
partner firms is made based on the industry of the alliance. 
Table II presents data descriptive for partner firms entering diversifying and non-
diversifying strategic alliances. Firms entering diversifying strategic alliances are on average 
more mature, have a lower market to book ratio, and a higher debt ratio than firms entering non-
diversifying strategic alliances. The difference in research and development ratio is also 
significantly different from zero at 1% level, indicating that firms forming a non-diversifying 
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strategic alliance are more research intensive than those forming diversifying strategic 
alliances.12  
 
Table II 
The sample consists on 2489 firms that initiate diversifying strategic alliances and 785 firms that initiate non-
diversifying strategic alliances. Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm. Market to book ratio is 
the ratio of the market value to the book value of assets. Research and development is equal to research and 
development expenditures divided by book value of assets. Debt ratio is defined as debt over book value of assets 
where debt is the long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. Cash flow from operations is cash flow generated 
from all operating activities and is measured as a ratio relative to the total assets of the firm. Operating return on 
assets is operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Herfindahl Index is calculated as Herfindahl 
Index=  where ∑
=
N
i
i
1
2α iα  represents the market share of firm i within an industry with N firms. The last column 
shows the Wilcoxon rank-sum test and the Median Two-Sample test. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Non-diversifying 
Strategic alliances 
 
Diversifying 
Strategic alliances 
 
p-value 
Size 5.958 
(5.789) 
 
6.772 
(6.807) 
0.000*** 
0.000*** 
Market to Book 5.217 
(3.052) 
 
3.857 
(2.264) 
0.000*** 
0.000*** 
Research and Development 0.161 
(0.128) 
 
0.132 
(0.103) 
0.000*** 
0.000*** 
Debt ratio 0.122 
(0.044) 
 
0.158 
(0.117) 
0.000*** 
0.000*** 
Cash flow from Operating Activities 0.061 
(0.105) 
 
0.043 
(0.149) 
0.000*** 
        0.022** 
Operating return on assets 0.097 
(0.156) 
 
0.086 
(0.088) 
0.007*** 
         0.187 
Herfindahl Index 0.144 
(0.062) 
 
0.236 
(0.186) 
0.000*** 
0.000*** 
Number of firms 785 2489  
 
                                                 
12 Firms are required to report research and development expenses when they exceed 1% of the total sales. 
Following Campa and Kedia (2003), I replace all the missing observations with zero and compute the means for the 
two sub-samples.  The difference remains statistically significant at the conventional levels. 
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The statistical significant difference in Herfindahl–Hirschman index variable indicates 
that partner firms forming diversifying strategic alliances are from industries with a higher 
concentration than those forming non-diversifying strategic alliances. Although not reported in 
the table, the analysis indicates that the percentage of technological non-diversifying strategic 
alliances is higher than the percentage of technological diversifying strategic alliances. 
4.3.2. Market reaction around the announcement of strategic alliance formations 
I investigate the market abnormal return for the sample of firms entering strategic 
alliances, and I present the results for the two sub-samples of diversifying and non-diversifying 
strategic alliances. I further divide the diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliances in 
technological and non-technological sub-samples. Consistent with the main prediction of 
hypothesis H1, I find statistical significant positive abnormal returns for the whole sample. 
    Table III summarizes the abnormal returns over different time intervals around the date 
of the announcement. I obtain a significant mean two –day cumulative abnormal return of 1.16% 
for the event window (-1, 0), and a significant mean three-day abnormal return of 0.99 % for the 
event window (-1, +1). Consistent with predictions made by Hypothesis H1, Panel B and C show 
that the market reaction is higher at the announcements of non-diversifying strategic alliances 
than at the announcements of diversifying strategic alliances. The analysis of the market reaction 
for the sub-samples of technological alliances reveals that most of the positive market reaction is 
confined to non-diversifying technological strategic alliances. This result is consistent with the 
evidence presented by Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) and Das, Sen and Sengupta 
(1998). 
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Table III 
Cumulative abnormal returns over selected intervals for a sample of 3274 firms that announced strategic alliances 
formation during the period 1991-2000. The sample consists on 785 firms that initiate diversifying strategic 
alliances and 2489 firms that initiate non-diversifying strategic alliances. Strategic alliances are identified from the 
SDC database. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 155-day period 
ending 45 days before the announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted index is used in the market model to 
compute betas. The abnormal returns are cumulated in the intervals. The percentage positive is the ratio of the 
number of firms with positive abnormal returns to the total number of firms. The Wilcoxon rank test is used to test 
the statistical significance of median abnormal returns. $, *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, and 
0.1%  levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: All Parent firms 
Interval Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample 
 
 Mean% Median z-statistic Wilcoxon rank test 
-1 to 0 
 
1.16 0.64 9.73*** 3.814*** 
-1 to +1 
 
0.99 0.54 6.69*** 2.107** 
-20 to +5 
 
0.76 0.39        1.65*                -2.882 
 
Panel B: Parent firms for diversifying strategic alliances 
Interval Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample 
 
 Mean% Median z-statistic Wilcoxon rank test 
-1 to 0 
 
0.90 0.21 6.89*** 3.287*** 
-1 to +1 
 
0.69 0.13 4.03*** 1.313* 
-20 to +5 
 
0.63 0.32         0.91                 -2.978 
   
  Panel C: Parent firms for non-diversifying strategic alliances 
Interval Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample 
 
 Mean% Median z-statistic Wilcoxon rank test 
-1 to 0 
 
1.98 0.50 7.58*** 2.888*** 
-1 to +1 
 
1.97 0.72  6.47*** 2.608*** 
-20 to +5 
 
1.15 0.67         1.74*               -1.189 
 
Panel D: Parent firms for non-diversifying, non-technological strategic alliances 
Interval Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample 
 
 Mean% Median z-statistic Wilcoxon rank test 
-1 to 0 
 
0.97 0.39 2.043** 0.130 
-1 to +1 
 
1.37 0.52  3.038*** 0.759 
-20 to +5 
 
-0.53 -0.29        0.896 -1.389 
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 (table III continued) 
 
 Panel E: Parent firms for non-diversifying, technological strategic alliances 
Interval Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample 
 
 Mean% Median z-statistic Wilcoxon rank test 
-1 to 0 
 
2.48 0.55 7.589*** 3.641*** 
-1 to +1 
 
2.26 0.84  5.780*** 2.880*** 
-20 to +5 
 
1.99 0.96        1.501*               -0.649 
 
  Panel F: Parent firms for diversifying, non- technological strategic alliances 
Interval Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample 
 
 Mean% Median z-statistic Wilcoxon rank test 
-1 to 0 
 
0.70 0.22 3.742*** 2.443*** 
-1 to +1 
 
0.53 0.23  2.298***                 1.110 
-20 to +5 
 
0.81 0.68        0.694                -1.718 
 
  Panel G: Parent firms for diversifying, technological strategic alliances 
Interval Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample 
 
 Mean% Median z-statistic Wilcoxon rank test 
-1 to 0 
 
1.07 0.19 5.913*** 2.639*** 
-1 to +1 
 
0.82 0.08 3.366***                0.949 
-20 to +5 
 
0.49 0.09       0.364               -2.777 
 
     
4.3.3. Firm’s choice between diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliance  
Table IV presents the results of the analysis of the firms’ choice of a diversifying or non-
diversifying strategic alliance. Furthermore, given the choice of a non-diversifying strategic 
alliance the analysis presents the main determinants of the degree of overlap between the 
strategic alliance activity and existing activities developed in the house by the partner firm. I 
conduct this analysis by using Heckman two-stage model. 
 The dependent variable for the probit model (selection model) is a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 for partner firms forming non-diversifying strategic alliances and 0 otherwise.  
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Table IV 
The dependent variable in the selection model is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for non-diversifying strategic 
alliances and 0 otherwise. On the second and third column, the dependent variable is the degree of overlap of the 
strategic alliance with one of the existing segments of the parent firm. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated as 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index= , where ∑
=
N
i
i
1
2α iα  represents the market share of firm i within an industry with N 
firms. GDP is the real growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. Technology dummy takes value 1 if the contract 
specifies either one or a combination of R&D, technology or product development and 0 otherwise. Size is the 
natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm. Cash flow from operations is cash flow generated from all operating 
activities and is measured as a ratio relative to the total assets of the firm. Operating return on assets is operating 
income before depreciation divided by total assets. The growth dummy is an indicator variable, which is one if the 
firm is high-growth, and 0 otherwise. Segment investment ratio is defined as capital expenditures at segment level 
divided by total sales of the segment and is calculated for the segment that has the same SIC code with the that of 
the strategic alliance. Number of segments represents the number of segments of the parent firm. *, **, and *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
PANEL A 
Regressions 
 
Predicted sign 
 
Selection model  (1) 
 
Substantial analysis (1) 
 
Constant  -0.356 
(0.01) 
 
1.192 
(0.00) 
Herfindahl Index -       -1.696*** 
(0.00) 
 
 
GDP +/-   4.826 
(0.10) 
 
 
Technology dummy +         1.294*** 
(0.00) 
 
 
Size -       -0.074*** 
(0.00) 
 
      -0.010*** 
(0.00) 
Cash flow form operations +        0.434*** 
(0.00) 
 
 0.024 
(0.39) 
 
Growth dummy +      0.121** 
(0.02) 
 0.015 
(0.26) 
 
Segment investment ratio +       0.001** 
(0.04) 
 
Number of segments -      -0.092** 
(0.01) 
 
LAMBDA       -0.071** 
(0.01) 
Total effect of age   -0.013 
(0.11) 
Total effect of Cash flow   0.044 
(0.57) 
Total effect of Growth dummy   0.020 
(0.57) 
Number of firms  3274 785 
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(table IV continued) 
PANEL B 
Regressions 
 
 
Predicted sign 
 
Selection model (2) 
 
Substantial analysis (2) 
 
Constant   -0.394 
(0.00) 
 
1.192 
(0.00) 
Herfindahl Index -       -1.734*** 
(0.00) 
 
 
GDP +/-    4.877* 
(0.09) 
 
 
Technology dummy +         1.292*** 
(0.00) 
 
 
Size -       -0.066*** 
(0.00) 
 
      -0.009*** 
(0.00) 
Operating return on assets +      0.261** 
(0.01) 
 
 0.022 
(0.38) 
Growth dummy +      0.120** 
(0.02) 
  0.015 
(0.26) 
 
Segment investment ratio +       0.001** 
(0.04) 
 
Number of segments -      -0.093** 
(0.01) 
 
LAMBDA        0.072** 
(0.01) 
Total effect of age   -0.012 
(0.11) 
Total effect of Operating return   0.033 
(0.62) 
Total effect of Growth dummy   0.020 
(0.56) 
Number of firms  3274 785 
 
 
The dependent variable at the second stage (the OLS analysis) is the degree of overlap 
between strategic alliance activity (four digits SIC code) and the activity of existing business 
segments. The degree of overlap is defined as the ratio of the sale of the focal business segment 
(the segment with the same SIC code as the primary SIC of the strategic alliance) and the total 
sales at the firm level. The results at the selection level model indicate that firms in highly 
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competitive industries are willing to form non-diversifying strategic alliances in order to 
preserves their market share. The coefficient of GDP is positive but marginally significant, 
indicating that diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliances are equally likely to be 
formed during economic expansion. The results also indicate that technological strategic 
alliances are more likely to be formed as a non-diversifying strategy in order to minimize the 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The coefficients of growth dummy and cash flow 
from operations are positive, and the coefficient of size is negative, indicating that young 
companies forming non-diversifying strategic alliances are trading growth opportunities and a 
relatively superior financial position for market recognition. The analysis reveals remains 
unchanged when operating return on assets is used instead of cash flow from operations.   
 Substantial analysis indicates that size, growth opportunities and performance measures 
are not related to the degree of overlap between the alliance activity and the existing activities. 
Consistent with hypothesis H2e, the coefficient of the segment investment ratio of the focal 
segment has the predicted sign and is highly significant at the conventional levels. This result 
indicates that the degree of overlap is positively related to the investment ratio. Therefore, 
partially consistent with Stopford and Wells (1972), my result indicates that strategic alliances 
overlapping peripheral segments duplicate business segments in which the management has 
made low level of investment. The coefficient of Lambda is statistically significant than zero in 
both analyses. 
4.3.4. Changes in excess value around strategic alliance formation 
The sample used to test hypotheses H3 is constructed using a multiple-stage process. I 
start with the sub-sample of 1956 publicly traded partner firms forming strategic alliances during 
1991-1997.  First, I exclude firms that do not have financial data available on Compustat, both at 
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the firm and segment level, one year after the strategic alliance formation. I exclude any firm that 
have at least one financial segment or when one of its business segments is not assigned an SIC. 
Second, following the convention in the literature, I exclude any firms where the sum of 
divisional assets deviates by more than 25% of the firm total assets. This sample cleaning 
process results in 898 firms. The restriction of the sample for the period during 1991 and 1997 is 
motivated by the change In 1997 the Securities and Exchange Committee adopted the Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards 131 (SFAS 131) that replaced SFAS 1413.  
 
Table V 
This table reports excess value based on asset multiplier for the year prior to and the year following the strategic 
alliance formation. The sample consists of 898 firms that initiated a strategic alliance between 1991 and 1996 with 
sufficient data to calculate excess value as defined in Berger and Ofek (1995). Panel A reports results for the full 
sample. Panel B and C examine sub-samples. The last row of every panel reports the p-value for the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test for the difference in means. . *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: All Partner firms 
 Excess value based on 
asset multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value based 
on sale multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value before      0.082*** 
(0.053) 
 
898      0.164*** 
(0.103) 
898 
Excess value after                0.039*** 
(0.011) 
 
898      0.057*** 
(0.017) 
898 
Difference      0.000***        0.000***  
 
Panel B: Single segment firms 
 Excess value based on 
asset multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value based 
on sale multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value before      0.088*** 
(0.061) 
 
784       0.205*** 
(0.151) 
784 
Excess value after                0.041*** 
(0.007) 
 
784      0.083*** 
(0.036) 
784 
Difference      0.000***        0.000***  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Detailed description of SFAS 131 and SFAS 14 is available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-7549.htm 
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(table V continued) 
 
Panel C: Multiple segment firms 
 Excess value based on 
asset multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value based 
on sale multiplier 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
Excess value before                0.042 
(0.018) 
 
114     -0.114*** 
(0.122) 
114 
Excess value after                0.022 
(0.021) 
 
114     -0.120*** 
(0.101) 
114 
Difference    0.445     0.000***  
 
 
Table V presents the mean and median excess value based on asset and sales multiplier of 
the partner firms in the year before and the year after strategic alliance formation. The mean 
excess value before strategic alliance formation is a statistically significant 0.082 based on asset 
multiplier and 0.164 based on sales multiplier. Therefore, the partner firms in my sample are 
valued at 20.78% above the imputed value based on asset multiplier, and 45.88% above the 
imputed value based on sales multiplier. In the year following the strategic alliance formation, 
the average excess value is a statistically significant 0.039 based on asset multiplier and 0.057 
for sales multiplier. I perform a similar analysis for the two sub-samples of single segment and 
multiple segment firms.  The analysis indicates that the premium documented before the strategic 
alliance formation for the whole sample is confined to the sub-sample of single segment firms. 
Single segment firms forming strategic alliances are traded at a premium of almost 15% before 
the strategic alliance formation and 11% after the alliance formation. The decrease in excess 
value for this sub-sample is statistically significant and indicates that single segment firms are 
negatively affected by the lack of having an efficient internal capital market. In contrast, the 
excess value measure for the multiple segment firms is statistically indistinguishable from zero, 
both before and after the alliance formation. On one hand, no change in excess value for multiple 
segment firms may reflect the fact that strategic alliance formation is a step further in 
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maintaining a relatively good valuation compared to industry counterparts. On the other hand, 
one should consider the size of the investment required for the strategic alliance as compared to 
the size of the partner firm that initiates it. It may also be the case that, on average, required 
investment for strategic alliance initiation is smaller than other types of investment undertaken 
by a multiple segment firm. 
 The analysis of the change in excess value calculated using sales multiplier shows that 
single segment firms are traded at an impressive premium, both before and after the year of 
alliance formation, while multiple segment firms are traded at a discount. However, the decrease 
in excess value based on sales multiplier is statistically significant only for single segment firms. 
My results support the evidence presented by Berger and Ofek (1995).  In their study, the excess 
value of the single segment firms is higher than the excess value of the multiple segment firms.  
However, the magnitude of the excess value that I document for the sample of partnering firms is 
higher, both for diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliances 
In summary, the change in excess value around strategic alliance formation indicates that 
the potential long-term benefit expected from the alliance comes at an immediate cost, which 
results in value destruction. However, the analysis reveals that the effect is mostly confined to 
single segment firms. The valuation of the multiple segment firms relative to their industry 
counterparts is not affected by strategic alliance formations. 
4.4. Conclusion 
This study analyses the market reaction at the announcements of strategic alliances 
formation. Consistent with previous findings, I document that on average, investors perceive 
these corporate strategies to be value creating. I divide strategic alliances into diversifying and 
non-diversifying based on the degree of overlap of their activity with concurrent activities 
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undertaken by the partner firms, and further for each of the two sub-samples in distinguish 
between technological and non-technological strategic alliances. The analysis reveals that most 
of the positive abnormal returns are confined to the sub-sample of technological non-diversifying 
strategic alliances. 
I find that diversifying strategic alliances are less likely to be formed by younger firms 
with high growth opportunities and good operating performance, situated in highly competitive 
industries. I also suggest that technological strategic alliances are more likely to be formed as 
non-diversifying strategies. Furthermore, the degree of overlap between strategic alliance activity 
and concurrent activities undertaken by the partner firms is positively related to the investment 
ratio of the focal segment. 
I also find that strategic alliances formation negatively impact the valuation of partner 
firms relative to their industry counterparts. However, this result seems to be mostly confined to 
the sub-sample of single segment firms.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This study analyses the market reaction at the announcements of alliances formation, 
firm’s choice of entering an alliance as a diversifying or non-diversifying strategy and the 
immediate impact of the alliance formation on the valuation of the partnering firms relative to 
their industry counterparts.  
In Chapter 3, I conduct the analysis on a sample of publicly traded firms initiating 239 
joint ventures between 1991and 1999. Consistent with previous evidence in the literature, I find 
that joint venture announcements are met, on average, with a positive market reaction. The 
results also indicate that joint ventures creating value upon announcements can be distinguished 
from those that do not create value. The positive wealth effect around the announcements is 
confined to the sub-sample of non-diversifying joint ventures. 
 I also show that a firm’s decision to enter a joint venture designed as a diversifying or a 
non-diversifying strategy is motivated by the interaction of industry- and firm-specific factors. 
Non-diversifying joint ventures are more likely to be formed by firms operating in highly 
competitive industries, during economic downturns, and are designed as appropriate strategies 
for complex joint ventures. The degree of overlap between the joint venture activity and existing 
activities developed by the partnering firm is higher for younger firms and for firms with higher 
growth opportunities.   
I also analyze the short run impact of joint venture formation on the valuation of the 
partnering firms.  I use a sample of 184 publicly traded firms initiating a joint venture between 
1991 and 1996. I document that the joint venture formations negatively impacts the valuation of 
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the partnering firms, and the effect is confined to the sub-sample of single segment firms. I 
further show that for the sub-samples of multiple segment firms there is no significant change in 
the excess value around the joint venture formations. Moreover, the efficiency of capital 
allocation across different segments remains unaltered after the joint venture formation. 
The focus of Chapter 4 is the analysis of three major hypotheses for a sample of firms 
forming strategic alliances. The first hypothesis predicts that, on average, market participants 
perceive strategic alliances as value creating corporate events. Within the second set of 
hypotheses I make predictions about the impact of various factors on a firm’s choice of forming 
a diversifying or non-diversifying strategic alliance.   
I conduct my analysis using a sample of 1,638 strategic alliances formed between 1991 
and 2000 by publicly traded industrial firms. The magnitude of the market reaction at the 
announcements of strategic alliance formation is comparable with previous evidence documented 
in the literature. My results also support the argument that the highest price reaction is confined 
to partner firms entering technological, non-diversifying strategic alliances.  
The results of the analysis of the second set of hypotheses reveal that a firms’ decision to 
enter a strategic alliance, designed as either a diversifying or a non-diversifying strategy, is a 
result of a complex interaction of external conditions and internal needs. Non-diversifying 
alliances are mainly formed by partnering firms positioned in highly competitive industries, 
during periods of recession, and are designed as the appropriate strategy for complex alliances. 
Consistent with learning argument, the degree of overlap between the activity of the strategic 
alliance and the existing activities developed in the house in determined by relative efficiency of 
the focal segments.  
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In Chapter 4 I also study the short-term impact of strategic alliances formation on the 
valuation of the partnering firms relative to their industry counterparts. Using a sample of 898 
firms initiating strategic alliances between 1991 and 1996, I document that potential long-term 
benefit provided by strategic alliances comes at an immediate cost incurred during the year 
following the alliance formation. The negative effect is exclusively confined to the sub-sample of 
single segment firms.  
In summary, this study shows that alliances formation, as hybrid forms of governance, is 
a result of an interaction of external factors and internal conditions. Market participants have the 
ability to distinguish between alliances that create value and those that do not create value. The 
decrease in the valuation of the partner firms after the alliance formation demonstrates that the 
long-term benefits provided by entering an alliance comes at an immediate cost.  
A possible direction for future research would be the extension of the analysis presented 
in this manuscript to the cross-border alliances. Future research in this area should also focus on 
the examination of different financial arrangements made by partnering firms in raising the 
necessary capital at the initiation and throughout the life of the alliance.  
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